HIV-Infected Health Care Workers Who Perform
Invasive, Exposure-Prone Procedures: Defining the
Risk and Balancing the Interests of Health Care
Workers and Patients

INTRODUCTION

In the early 1990s, a report of a dentist who transmitted Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS)' to a patient resulted in
mass fear and confusion among the health care industry, regulatory
agencies, and the public at large.2 After conducting an extensive
study, the United States Centers for Disease Control (CDC)"confirmed that six patients of Dr. David Acer had become infected with
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 4 while under his care in the
early 1990s.5 This incident, known as the "Acer cluster,"6 however, is
See Part I.A.2 for an explanation of AIDS and how it affects the immune system.
2

The controversy was precipitated by a patient, Kimberly Bergalis, who was di-

agnosed with HIV two years after being treated by her dentist, David J. Acer, who
also was HIV positive. See GERALDJ. STTNE, ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME:
BIOLOGICAL, MEDICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES 194 (2d ed. 1996).
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is an agency of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that seeks "[t]o promote health
and quality of life by preventing and controlling disease, injury, and disability." CenOct.
20,
1997)
(visited
ters for
Disease Control and Prevention
<http://www,cdc.gov/aboutcdc.htm>.
See WILLAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WHO ARE HIV
PosrnvE 4-6 (1996). The distinction between the two terms exists because an individual can have HIV without showing any symptoms. See id. at 4-5. Nonetheless, the
entire range of HIV infection, which includes asymptomatic HIV infection, symptomatic HIV infection, and AIDS, is referred to as HIV disease. See id.
See American Bar Association, Calming AIDS Phobia: Legal Implications of the
Low Risk of TransmittingHIV in the Health Care Setting, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 733,
734-35 (Eric N. Richardson & Salvatore J. Russo eds., 1995) [hereinafter Calming
AIDS Phobia] (providing the American Bar Association's AIDS Coordinating Committee's report on HLV and health care workers).
a "Cluster" is a CDC term that refers to a "group of patients who have been infected by exposure to a single health care worker [HCW]." See Calming AIDS Phobia,
supra note 5, at 734 n.3 (citing Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients
DuringExposure-ProneInvasive Procedures,40 MORBIDITY & MORTALIlY WKLY.REP. 1, 2-3
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the only known transmission of HIV from a health care worker
(HCW)7 to a patient in the United States. Because of obstacles to
reporting exposures and unreliable data regarding how many physicians have been infected with AIDS, the fact that the Acer cluster is
the only documented instance of transmission should not be considered dispositive.8 Further, the CDC's confirmation of a report in
(1991)).
7 For CDC purposes, HCWs were defined in 1992 as "persons,
who worked in
health-care, clinical or HIV-laboratory settings." Surveillance for Occupationally Acquired HIV Infection--United States, 1981-92, 41 MORBIDITy & MoRTALmn WKLY. REP.
823-25 (1992). In the recent draft guidelines from the CDC entitled Infection Control in Health Care Personne HCWs include:
[AIll paid and unpaid persons working in health care settings who
have the potential for exposure to infectious materials, including body
substances, contaminated medical supplies and equipment, contaminated environmental surfaces, or contaminated air. These personnel
may include, but are not limited to, emergency medical service personnel, dental personnel, laboratory personnel, mortuary personnel,
nurses, nursing assistants, physicians, technicians, students and trainees, contractual staff not employed by the health care facility, and persons not directly involved in patient care (e.g., clerical, dietary, housekeeping, maintenance, and volunteer personnel) but potentially
exposed to infectious agents.
62 Fed. Reg. 47276 (1997).
a There is, however, significant controversy as to the events of this case. See Alix
R. Rubin, Comment, HIV Positive, Employment Negative? HIV DiscriminationAmong
Health Care Workers in the United States and France, 17 COMP. LW. L.J. 398, 407-08
(1996). For example, although the dentist used barrier precautions, he did not
comply with the CDC's universal precautions. See id. at 408.
In addition, the established facts made it difficult to prove the transmission of
HIV from HCW to patient. See STINE, supra note 2, at 194-95. First, Bergalis's dental
records demonstrate that her two extractions were not complicated, making infection less likely. See id. at 194. Second, interviews with Bergalis and Acer failed to
elicit other risk factors even though Bergalis repeatedly asserted that she was a virgin, an issue that was disputed. See id. at 194-95. Third, tests of both Bergalis's and
Acer's DNA strains indicated a high degree of similarity. See id. at 195. Fourth, the
two-year interval between Bergalis's dental procedure and her development of AIDS
was short-Bergalis developed oral candidadas only 17 months after being infected,
which is rare considering that "1% of infected homosexual/bisexual men and 5%
of infected transfusion recipients develop AIDS within two years of infection." Id.
Reportedly, Bergalis settled her suit with Acer's insurance company for $1 million
and with his estate for an undisclosed amount. See id. Before her death in December 1991, Bergalis testified before Congress to encourage legislation mandating
HIV testing of all HCWs. See id. at 195-96. Ironically, after writing a blasting letter
to the Florida Department of Health blaming the department for failing to do a
"damn thing," she admitted on national television that she was treated by another
dentist but declined to inform him of her HIV status. See id.
When the sixth infected patient, who did not undergo an invasive procedure,
was identified in 1993, some speculated that Acer may have intentionally, rather
than negligently, infected his patients. See Barry Sullivan, When The Environment is
Other People: An Essay on Science, Culture, and the Authoritative Allocation of Values, 69
NOTRE DAM E L. REv. 597, 623-24 (1994).
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France of an orthopedic surgeon who was diagnosed with full blown
AIDS in 1994 and transmitted the virus to a patient in 1992 during
surgery demonstrates that the Acer cluster is not an anomaly.9 Some
infection control experts hope that the incident in France will dispel
the collective belief in the health care industry that the Acer cluster
was a random occurrence.10
Although federal disability law prohibits employers from discriminating against HIV-infected HCWs based on the contagious nature of the disease, exceptions exist if the person poses a "direct
threat" or "significant risk" to others. Therefore, if a HCW suffers
from a disability such as HIV and poses "a significant risk" to others
while performing the essential functions of the job, that HCW is
deemed not qualified for that position." Consequently, some HCWs
are not protected by disability law. As will be discussed in this Note,
the debate surrounding protection of infected HCWs centers on a
law regarding what constitutes a "significant
tension
2 in the case
risk."0
Although many courts have concluded that HIV poses a substantial risk to patients that cannot be eliminated,' the American
Medical and Dental Associations (AMA and ADA) have classified the
risk as insufficient to warrant mandatory testing or mandatory disclosure to patients. 4 Because the informed consent doctrine is not
premised on what the physician deems material but rather on what a
reasonable patient considers material, the medical profession has
violated the essence of informed consent by allowing physician paternalism and egotism to supersede patient autonomy."'
9 See CDC: French HIV Surgical Case Will Not Affect U.S. Policy on Infected Providers,
Hosp. INFECTION CONTROL, Mar. 1997, at 33-34 (noting that the risk is not zero but
it is very low). Yet testing was only performed on 968 of the surgeon's 2458 patients. See id. at 34.
10 See id. (noting that some experts think the health care industry is in denial of

the risk of HCW-to-patient transmission of HV).
1 See Part II.D of this Note for the legal analysis of whether someone who poses
a 'significant threat" to patients is qualified to work in the health care field.
See generally Part II.D of this Note (discussing the inconsistent application of
significant risk" analysis by federal courts).

3 See Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 886 F. Supp. 1349, 1353 (W.D. Mich 1995)

(commenting that a "mere scintilla of evidence [of risk] does not alter the facts that
transmission is possible and invariably lethal"); Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr.,
249 N.J. Super. 597, 651, 592 A.2d 1251, 1279 (Law Div. 1991) (noting that the risk
of transmission and the anxiety that accompanies that risk both pose a substantial
risk to patients).
14 See BARRY R. FuRRow rr AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERALS AND PROBLEMS 419
(3d ed. 1997).
15 See Part III of this Note for an analysis of informed consent.
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Concededly, the CDC has documented only six patients contracting HIV from a HCW. This should not end the inquiry, however, as to whether mandatory testing or mandatory disclosure of a

HCW's HIV status should be required to protect patients from potential exposure. Because actual injury is required for a patient to
prevail under informed consent,' 6 recovery is unrealistic unless actual
transmission occurs. Despite the proof problems that would hinder
patients' success rates on informed consent claims, patients should
not be precluded from prevailing on other tort claims such as the
negligent or the intentional infliction17 of emotional distress.' 8
This Note examines the myriad of legal issues that the Acer cluster triggered. Part I explains general information and terminology
regarding HIV and AIDS. Part II examines two federal laws, section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (section 504) ' and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 20 that prohibit disabilitybased discrimination unless the individual poses a "significant
threat" to others. Part III examines patients' claims under the informed consent doctrine and the negligent or the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Part IV proposes three recommendations
for eliminating the confusion regarding the "significant threat" test
to balance physicians' interests in avoiding disability-based discrimination and patients' interests in ensuring that they are not placed at
unnecessary and avoidable risk of HIV transmission. 2 ' The proposal
See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting
that "[a]n unrevealed risk that should have been made known must materialize, for
otherwise the omission, however unpardonable, is legally without consequence.").
17 See, e.g., KA.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 560 (Minn. 1995). The intentional infliction of emotional distress requires a showing (a) of extreme and outrageous conduct, (b) of conduct that was either intentional or reckless, (c) that the
defendant knew that the conduct would likely cause severe emotional distress, and
(d) that severe, emotional distress did occur. See id.
is Under common-law principles, if a negligent action results in physical injury,
the actor may also be liable for emotional injury that ensues. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 456 (1995). Further, emotional injury may include the apprehension regarding the effects of the injury. In the HIV context, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that he (1) was within a zone of danger, (2) reasonably feared for his
safety, and (3) suffered severe emotional distress with accompanying physical manifestations. See K.A. C., 527 N.W.2d at 557.
19 See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (1998) (providing a definition of disability), id. § 794
(providing the legal framework for analyzing disability discrimination).
20 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1998).
2 This Note does not examine whether the distinction between
a physician as
an independent contractor or employee is relevant for ADA purposes. For a more
in-depth analysis on that subject, see Michael R. Lowe, Stirring Muddled Waters: Are
Physicianswith HospitalMedical Staff PrivilegesConsidered Employees Under Title VII or the
ADA Act When Alleging an Employment DiscriminationClaim?, 1 DEPAULJ. HEALTHCA
16
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encompasses three concepts: (1) clarification of the "significant
threat"" test by CDC experts, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), ethicists, patient advocates, physicians, and
other HCWs to be codified by Congress; (2) mandatory testing of
HCWs involved in exposure-prone procedures; and (3) mandatory
informed consent if the HIV-positive HCW wishes to participate in
exposure-prone procedures.
Indisputably, AIDS is a devastating disease that has triggered legitimate fears in the general public because, at present, there is no
cure.2 That a patient is at risk of contracting the fatal disease each
time an HIV-infected physician performs an invasive, exposure-prone
procedure heightens this concern. Unfortunately, dissemination of
piecemeal and sometimes contradictory information about the disease has resulted in discrimination based upon unfounded fears. To
L. 119 (1996).
22 The terms "significant risk," "significant threat," and "direct threat" are used
interchangeably throughout this Note.
23 See RUBENSTEIN ET At., supra note 4, at 3. Although there are
no vaccines or
cures, a group of 50 doctors volunteered to test the efficacy of an AIDS vaccine. See
Ronald Kotulak, Doctors Volunteer for Live HIV Tests: Physicians Push For Potentially
Risky AIDS Vaccine Experiments on Humans, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Nov. 12,
1997, at Al. Although there is no cure, treatments involving protease inhibitors
have been somewhat effective at slowing the replication of HIV within the body. See
Martin Markowitz, M.D., Protease Inhibitors: What They Are, How They Work, When to
Use Them (visited Sept. 23, 1997) <http://www.iapac.org/consumer/proinbk.html>.
Protease inhibitors prevent one of H1V's enzymes, protease, from replicating in
such a way that furthers the HIV infection. See id. Although protease inhibitors do
not rid a body of the HIV infection, they reduce the amount of the virus by almost
99%. See id. Consequently, fewer helper cells are infected and subsequently destroyed, resulting in an HIV-infected individual being able to fight off other infections, thereby lengthening his lifespan. See id. Protease inhibitors differ from other
anti-HIV drugs, such as azidothymidine (AZT), a form of a reverse transcriptase inhibitor, in their target and their strength. See id. While reverse transcriptase inhibitors halt the duplication of HIV's genetic material by protecting a cell's nucleus,
protease inhibitors result in defective HIV replicas that cannot infect new cells. See
id. By combining these two types of inhibitors, physicians enable HIV-infected patients to battle the disease more effectively. See id.
Protease inhibitors, however, are not a cure for HIV infection. See id. In fact,
researchers have recently confirmed that protease inhibitors and reverse transcriptase inhibitors do not actually eliminate the AIDS virus from the human body. See
Christine Gorman, The Odds Grow Longer: Doctors Had Hoped by Now to Have Eliminated the AIDS Virus from Some Patients. No Such Luck, TIME, Nov. 24, 1997, at 84.
Rather, researchers such as Dr. David Ho, a pioneer in AIDS research, have discovered in three studies that HIV merely lurks in the memory T-cells. See id. Researchers speculate that HIV could hide in T-cells during a resisting phase without
replicating themselves for decades. See id. Although people living with HIV can
survive the infection for an extended period of time due to the combinations of inhibitors, the next step is to find a way to lure the dormant virus out of the T-cells
and immediately attack the infected T-cells. See id.
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balance those considerations, the aforementioned recommendations
seek to (1) relieve HCWs of the burden of making the highly subjective decision as to whether they should voluntarily remove themselves from procedures and (2) reassure patients that they are not
being exposed to HIV. In short, although HCWs should not be discriminated against for having HIV, their interests should not supersede patient protection. 24
I.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION REGARDING HIV AND AIDS

A. The AIDS Epidemic-Generally
1. Statistics
AIDS was first identified in the United States in 1981,2 and in
1993, it became the leading cause of death in the United States for
people between the ages of twenty-five and forty-four, "surpassing all
other diseases, automobile accidents, and gun violence." 26 In February 1998, a CDC expert reported a 44% drop in AIDS deaths during
the first half of 1997, due in large part to the development of new
treatments.2 Within the past two years, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported that as of 1995, twenty million people were infected with HIV-1.5 million are located in the United States.28 In
1997, however, the United Nations Commission on AIDS (UNAIDS)
and the WHO acknowledged that their earlier figures underestimated the scope of the epidemic by thirty percent.2 The 1997 report concluded that 30.6 million people are actually infected with
m
HIV."

24

See Michael L. Closen, HIV-AIDS, Infected Surgeons and Dentists, and the Medical

Profssion'sBetrayal ofIts Responsibility to Patients,41 N.Y.L. SCl. L. REv. 57, 58 (1996).
25 See NATIONAL HEALTH LAWYERS Ass'N, HEALTH LAw PRAclicE GUIDE § 10:3
(1997).
26 Calming AIDS Phobia, supra note 5, at 738. As of June 30, 1997, 612,078 people have been reported with AIDS in the United States. See Centersfor Disease Control
AIDS Information (visited Feb. 17, 1998) <http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/hiv.aids/hiv_
info/vfax/260230hun>.
27

See Daniel

Q. Haney,

Doctors Hail 44 % Drop in AIDS Deaths, STAR-LEDGER, Feb.

3, 1998, at 9; see also Update:

Trends in AIDS Incidenc--United States, 1996, 46

MORB[DrIY & MORTALrTY WKLY. REJ'. 37, 37 (1997) (attributing the decline to the

success of antiretroviral therapies).
28 See RUBENSTEIN ETAL., supranote 4, at 5.
29 See GlobalAIDS PictureDarker Than Thought, U.N. Study Says, ASBURY PARK
PRESS,
Nov. 27, 1997, atA9.
30 Se eid .
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The Nature of the Disease and How Transmission
Occurs

HIV annihilates the immune system by disengaging Tlymphocyte helper cells, rather than T-lymphocyte suppressor cells,
the former of which are responsible for attacking infectious agents.3'
Immediately upon infection, the T-lymphocyte helper cells activate
the immune system by multiplying and outnumbering the Tlymphocyte suppressor cells.32 Eventually, however, HIV disengages
the helper cells' ability to multiply and outnumber the suppressor
cells," leaving the helper cells ineffective in protecting the body from
disease. ' AIDS is the combination of conditions and illnesses that
manifest themselves during the later stages of HIV infection after the
immune system is disarmed.35
Although exposure to the virus does not necessarily result in infection, there are specific types of behavior and conditions that increase the likelihood of viral transmission: sexual contact, blood-toblood contact, and perinatal contact. For purposes of this Note,
blood-to-blood contact is of primary concern. Such contact can occur through needle-sharing, transfusion of tainted blood product,
transplantation of infectious tissue, and "exposure of mucous mem37
branes and non-intact skin to infectious blood or bodily fluids."
One cannot be infected, however, by donating blood or coming into
contact with tears, saliva, or urine, even though viral particles have
been found in these secretions." To prevent transmission of the virus, three primary harm-reduction techniques exist: (1) practicing
safer sex, (2) declining to share needles or equipment used to disinfect drugs or syringes, and (3) following universal precautions in the
health care setting. ' The final harm-reduction technique seeks to
protect both HCWs and patients from transmission of HIV, which is
the focus of this Note.

s1 See RUBENSTEIN ETAL., supra note 4, at 10.

s2 See id. at 10-11.
33 See id.
34 See id.
36 See id. at 4.
See id. at 6-7.
37

RuBENSrEIN

38 Se id. at 7.
' See id. at8.

ET AL., supranote 4, at 6-7.
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B. AIDS and Health Care Workers
Of the approximately 9,269,000 people employed by the health
care industry," 19,638 HCWs have been reported to be HIV-positive
as of June 30, 1997. 4' Although HCWs are in a high-risk profession,
as of mid-1997, only fifty-two HCWs were infected with HIV by a patient.4 2 These figures demonstrate that the risk of a physician being
infected by a patient is greater than the risk of a physician or other
HCW infecting a patient.' The difference becomes relevant because

a patient may refuse consent to treatment by an HIV-infected HCW,
but a HCW may not refuse a person treatment solely because of his
HIV-positive status." As will be discussed in Part III, the distinction is
premised on the notion that the physician has a fiduciary duty to his
patient whereas the patient does not have a corresponding ethical
duty to the physician.4 * The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in
the case of Abbott v. Bragdon may signify that the Court will explain
the foundation for this distinction.
40

See NATIONAL HALTH LAWYERS ASS'N, supra note 25, § 10:1. The CDC, how-

ever, estimates that 8.8 million people work in the health care field and 6 million
peole work in more than 6000 hospitals. See 62 Fed. Reg. 47276 (1997).
See Telephone Interview with CDC PH Guideline Information Center at 888232-3228 (Nov. 25, 1997) (on file with the Seton Hall Law Review). Of those 19,638
HCWs who are HIV positive, the occupations of 18,588 are known: 1591 physicians,
105 surgeons, 4378 nurses, 428 dental workers, 376 paramedics, 2616 technicians,
932 therapists, and 4082 health aides. See id. As of June 30, 1997, 76% have died.
See id. The breakdown by profession: 1258 physicians, 80 surgeons, 3329 nurses,
338 dental workers, and 263 paramedics. See id.
42 See Telephone Interview with CDC PH Guideline Information
Center at 888232-3228 (Nov. 25, 1997) (on file with the Seton Hall Law Review). Of the 52 infected employees the breakdown is as follows: 19 laboratory technicians, 21 nurses,
6 physicians and surgeons, 2 surgical technicians, 1 dialysis technician, 1 respiratory
therapist, 1 health aide, and 1 housekeeper. See id. Forty-five were infected by
puncture or cut transmission (percutaneous), 5 by mucous membrane or skin
transmission (mucotaneous), 1 both, and 1 unknown. See id. Twenty-four have
since died. See id.
43 See Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 8 OCCUPATIONAL MED. DIG. 7 (1996)
(noting
that the likelihood of acquiring HIV on the job depends on the prevalence of HIV
among patients, the "efficiency of transmission after a single contact with blood,"
and the nature and frequency of occupational blood contact).
44 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), (b) (1) (A) (i) (1998) (providing that no
individual
may deny persons equal enjoyment of the opportunity to obtain services from any
place of public accommodation, which has been interpreted to include clinics, hospitals, and doctors).
45 See Closen, supra note 24, at 119-20.
46 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that a dentist may not limit
the dental
services he is willing to provide to an asymptomatic, HIV-infected patient at a hospital), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether (1) reproduction is a major life activity within the purview of the
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1. The Nature and Likelihood of the Risk
Experts have speculated that HIV transmission from HCW to
patient can occur only if two elements exist. 7 First, transmission requires an intense trauma situation "that would provide a portal of
entry for the virus" into the human body, that would usually exist
during an invasive procedure.'8 Second, blood or some other bodily
fluid from the HCW's open tissue that would most likely manifest itself subsequent to a needle stick or scalpel injury during the invasive
must come into contact with the patient's "portal of enprocedure
49
try.
In response to the Acer cluster, the CDC conducted approximately seventy look-back studies to determine whether patients of
HIV-infected dentists, surgeons, and physicians were infected.0 At
present, no patients have tested positive."' These results are misleading, however, because testing was voluntary and that variable raises
the possibility "that included selection bias may have influenced the
results."" While these studies demonstrate that the Acer cluster is
the only known transmission in the United States, these studies do
not discount the possibility that patients have contracted and died of
AIDS after being exposed to an infected HCW. Given that almost
20,000 HGWs have contracted HIV out of a potential nine million,
the aforementioned studies are less than persuasive considering the
55
limited cross section of patients tested.
In addition, although the GDC estimated in the early 1990s that
the probability of a surgeon infecting a patient is

8 . 1 %,-

several ob-

stacles hinder confirmation of that estimate. Specifically, the fact
that over 15,000 HCWs have died of AIDS is not conclusive as to the
number of HCWs who have contracted the disease. Uncertainty as to
the actual number of HIV-infected HGWs plagues these studies beADA, (2) asymptomatic HIV is a per se disability under the ADA, and (3) a physician must perform invasive procedures on an HIV-infected individual. Oral argument is scheduled for March 30, 1998.
47 See Calming AIDS Phobia, supra note 5, at 739-40.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 740.
50 See id. at 743-44.
51 See id.
52 See LAWRENCE MIIKE & JULIA OSTROWSKY, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,

HIV IN THE
view).

HFALT4 CARE WORKPLACE 1 (1991)

(on file with the Seton Hall Law Re-

5- The number of HCWs who have contracted HIV does not reflect precisely
how many perform invasive procedures. See supra notes 41-42.
See Closen, supra note 24, at 73 (noting that the estimate was based on a
seven-year period assumed to be the work expectancy of an HIV-infected surgeon).
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cause no disclosure requirements or mandatory testing exists for
HCWs."" Thus, the report of only one incident of HCW-to-patient
transmission in the United States is not a reliable indicator of actual
transmission; after all, if we do not know the HIV status of HCWs,
how can we trace transmission of the disease? " In short, the health
care industry has failed to implement a7 systemic approach for determining which HCWs are HIV-positive.1
Further, look-back studies are not the most effective surveillance
method for identifying clusters of HCW-to-patient transmission.'
Look-back studies are only relevant and helpful in those instances
where a HCW's HIV status has been detected or volunteered. Therefore, some infection control experts advocate tracing a patient with
no identified risk factors (NIR) back to an infected HCW rather than
looking backwards from HCW to patient.
In addition to the problems attendant to look-back studies,
documentation of actual exposure in surgeries is hindered for several reasons. First, in complex surgical procedures it is difficult to
identify whether exposure has occurred based on the number of
people present and the instruments involved.' Second, patients are
not in a position to make such reports if they are unconscious.6 '
Third, subordinates are unlikely to report a potential exposure incident,62 and reporting would be impossible if the HIV statuses of the
surgeon and other participating HCWs are unknown. Finally, it is
unlikely that HCWs would voluntarily disclose an incident of actual
exposure because it would compromise their self-interests in avoid5
See id. at 79-80. Closen criticizes experts who discount the real threat of HCWto-patient transmission, commenting that
Advocates of the medical profession's version of the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy with respect to HIV infection among surgeons and dentists depend heavily upon the fact that [only one] documented case of
accidental transmission [exists]. They conclude that because of this
absence there is either no risk at all of HIV transmission to patients or
that the risk is so slight as to be irrelevant and immaterial. This
school of thought represents fragmented thinking. Assuming transmissions have occurred but have not been documented, this shortsighted and stubborn policy is killing people.
Id. (footnotes omitted).

3 See id. at85.

57

See id.

See ParisSurgeon Probably TransmittedHIV to Patient,Hosp. INFETION
(American Health Consultants), Feb. 1997, at 20.
59
See id.
See Closen, supra note 24, at 80.
61 See id.
62

See id.

CONTROL,
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ing discharge and malpractice suits." Thus, accounts that the Acer
cluster is the only known incident of physician to patient exposure in
the United States should not be considered dispositive on the subject.
Some critics attempt to downplay the risk associated with HCWpatient transmission by comparing the risk of dying from HIV exposure by a HCW and the probability of a patient dying from other
risks." For example, one medical expert commented that "a patient's chances of dying in an airplane flight or crossing the road to
get the mail are greater" than the likelihood of a HCW-to-patient infection.0 Another doctor argued that a patient's risk of HIV transmission by a HCW is less than the hazards associated with hospital
staph infections, anesthetic complications, or incompetence." The
primary distinction between the aforementioned risks and HIV
transmission is that a patient, if properly informed, could avoid infection.6' Although physicians cannot generally be held liable for
physician-specific risks, such as fatigue and depression, HIV should
not be classified within the physician-specific category, as will be discussed in Part III.
2.

How CDC Guidelines Seek to Reduce the Risk

On July 12, 1991, after documentation of the Acer cluster, the
CDC published Recommendationsfor Preventing Transmission of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis-B Virus to PatientsDuringExposureProneInvasive Procedures (CDC Recommendations)." In the 1991 report, the CDC acknowledged that adherence to universal precautions was not fool-proof given the
7 ° nature of certain invasive procedures" that are exposure-prone.
See id.at 81.
See Rubin, supra note 8, at 408-09. Rubin notes that experts have suggested
that HCW-to-patient transmission of HIV is as likely to happen as lightning striking
or winning the lottery. See id.
65 Id. at 409.
See id. at 489-90.
67 See FuRRow ET AL., supra note 14, at 417-18 (observing
the difference between
risk of disease infection and risks stemming from physicians' performance).
Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for Preventing Transmission
of
Human Immunodeficieny Virus and Hepatitis-B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone
Invasive Procedures,40 MORBIDrrY & MORTALrY WKLY. REP. 1 (1991) [hereinafter CDC
63

Recommendations].
69 See id. at 2. An invasive procedure
is the
"[surgical entry into tissues, cavities, or organs or repair of major
traumatic injuries" associated with any of the following: "(1) an operating or delivery room, emergency department or outpatient setting,
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Although the CDC stated that the risk of HIV transmission from
HCW-to-patient was smaller than Hepatitis B (HBV) transmission,
the CDC sought to minimize the risk of both HIV and HBV transmissions by recommending the following measures. First, "[a]ll HCWs
should adhere to universal precautions" that include protective barners, appropriate handwashing, and special care in the use and disposal of needles.7' Further, HCWs should comply with disinfection
and sterilization techniques for reusing devices in invasive procedures; any HCW who has "exudative lesions or weeping dermatitis
should refrain from" engaging in direct patient care or performing
invasive techniques until the condition dissipates.72 Second, if a
HCW participates in an invasive procedure that is not classified as
exposure-prone, there is no scientific evidence warranting restriction
of that HGW's participation.75 Third, medical, surgical, and dental
organizations and institutions should identify the exposure-prone
procedures at their respective facilities.74 Fourth, HCWs who perform invasive exposure-prone procedures are responsible for knowing their HIV status. 75 Fifth, HCWs who are HIV-positive should not
participate in exposure-prone procedures without approval from an
including both physicians' and dentists' offices; (2) cardiac catheterization and angiographic procedures; (3) a vaginal or cesarean delivery
or other invasive obstetric procedure during which bleeding may occur; or (4) the manipulation, cutting, or removal of any oral or perioral tissues, including tooth structure, during which bleeding occurs
or the potential for bleeding exists."
Id. ap)p.
70 See id. at 4. The CDC defined exposure-prone invasive
procedures as "certain
oral, cardiothoracic, colorectal ...and obstetric/gynecologic procedures." Id. The
CDC also included "[p]ercutaneous exposure of the patient to the HCW's blood
[during general surgery, gynecology, orthopedic, cardiac, and trauma events when
a] sharp object causing the injury recontacted the patient's wound." Id. According
to the CDC,
[ciharacteristics of exposure-prone procedures include digital palpation of a needle tip in a body tavity or the simultaneous presence of
the HCW's fingers and a needle or other sharp instrument or object
in a poorly visualized or highly confined anatomic site. Performance
of exposure-prone procedures presents a recognized risk of percutaneous injury to the HCW,and--if such injury occurs--the HCW's
blood is likely to contact the patient's body cavity, subcutaneous tissues, and/or mucous membranes.
Id. Where an invasive procedure does not have the above characteristics, the risk of
HIV transmission is substantially lower. See id.
71 Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
7 Id. (emphasis added).
72

74
75

See id.
See CDC Recommendations, supra note 68, at 5 (emphasis added).
See id. (noting requirements for HCWs who do not have serological evidence

of immunity from hepatitis).
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expert panel. 76 That panel would decide whether the HIV-infected

HCW should be permitted to continue working and whether his patients should be informed of his HIV status." Finally, the CDC does
not recommend mandatory testing of all HCWs given a cost-benefit
analysis of the risk that infected HCWs will transmit HIV or HBV and
the economic resources that mandatory testing would require. 78 Al-

though the CDC Recommendations provide a framework for preventing HIV transmission and determining whether a HCW should
be permitted to participate in exposure-prone procedures, they did
not provide any legal consequences for a physician, hospital, or
medical organization's
failure to comply with these precautionary
79
measures.

a. Increasing the Force of the Guidelines
As a result of the Acer cluster, Congress sought to prevent additional instances of HCW-to-patient HIV transmission by increasing
incentives for complying with the CDC Recommendations.80 The
first significant proposal from Congress, the Helms Disclosure Proposal, ' passed in the Senate and would have required HCWs to disclose their HIV status or be subject to a $10,000 fine and no less than
a ten-year prison term.8 The second proposal, the Kimberly Bergalis
Patient and Health Provider Protection Act of 1991, also referred to
as the Dannemeyer Proposal,8" mandated HIV testing of HCWs who
perform exposure-prone procedures, mandatory disclosure of those

See id. (emphasis added). The CDC also encourages career counseling
and
job retraining if a HCW becomes infected with HIV or HBV. See id. at 6. In addition, the CDC advocates periodic reevaluation to determine whether a HCW's antibody status has changed because of treatment. See id. In determining whether a
patient should be informed of exposure by an infected HCW, the CDC recommends proceeding on a case-by-case basis. See id. To that end, the CDC recommends consulting with state and local public health officials to determine whether
patients should be notified and, further, whether a follow-up study should be conducted. See id.
76

77

See id.

See id. at 6 (noting that the efficacy of the CDC's Recommendations can
be
increased through education, training, and appropriate confidentiality safeguards);
see also infra, note 94 (commenting that the mandatory approach to monitoring
HCWs would require downstream liability).
79 See generally CDC Recommendations, supra note 68
and accompanying text
(declining to provide any penalties for non-compliance).
so See Rubin, supranote 8, at 411.
81 H.R. 2622, 102d
Cong. (1991).
See id.
8s H.R. 2788, 102d Cong. (1991).
78
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test results, and nonconsensual testing of patients." Neither of these
proposals passed both houses of Congress.
Ultimately, Congress enacted the Treasury, Postal and General
Government Appropriations Act of 1992, which included the
Dole/CDC Amendment (the Act)." Within one year of its enactment, the Act required that each territory's and state's top public
health official certify to the Secretary of Health and Human Services
that the state's policy for adhering to the CDC Recommendations
was consistent with federal law. 86 In furtherance of that goal, the Act
required that each state articulate the process for determining disciplinary sanctions for failure to comply with the CDC Recommendations. If a state failed to articulate a policy to ensure compliance
with the CDC Recommendations by October 28, 1992,88 that state became "ineligible to receive assistance under the Public Health Serv-

ice Act."" By October 1992, twenty-three states and territories had
complied with the Act, twenty-nine had applied for an extension,
and seven states and territories had adopted the CDC Recommendations.9 0 Although all states and territories have complied with the
mandate,' approaches vary as evidenced by the existence of both
voluntary and mandatory guidelines.
8

See id.

See 42 U.S.C. § 300ee-2 (1998) (effective Oct. 28, 1991).
See id.
87

88

See id.

Pursuant to the Act, however, the Secretary may extend the deadline when a

state requires additional time to comply with the CDC Recommendations. See id.
89 Id.
90 See Rubin, supra note 8, at 412.
91 See Centersfor DiseaseControl and PreventionDraft Guidelinefor Infection Control in
Health Care Personnel, 1997, 62 Fed. Reg. 47276, 47279 (Sept. 8, 1997).

See

NATIONALHALTH LAwYERSAss'N,

supra note 25, § 10:14. In 1992, the Ha-

waii Governor's Committee on AIDS prepared two scenarios for implementing the
CDC Recommendations: the voluntary approach and the mandatory approach. See
id. Under the voluntary approach, HCWs should adhere to universal precautions,
should know their status and receive voluntary counseling, and state and institutional panels should advise the HIV-infected HCWs as to whether they should refrain from procedures. See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text (discussing
CDC Recommendations). Under Hawaii's voluntary approach, the infected HCW
would not be required to cease treating patients, would be able to maintain confidentiality, and would be required to disclose her HIV status only upon written consent. See NATIONALHFALTH LAWYERS ASS'N, supra note 25, § 10:15. Any proposal related to notifying a patient or reassigning a HCW would be purely advisory and
subject to the HCW's final approval, unless there is evidence that the HCW is functionally impaired. See id. Hawaii, Illinois, Missouri, New York, Oklahoma, and
Texas follow this approach. See id. Essentially, under the voluntary approach HCWs
exercise wide discretion in determining whether they should restrict their job activities.
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b. Why Universal Precautions Do Not Ensure Universal
Compliance or Universal Protection
Both the CDC Recommendations and the Act do not ensure
universal compliance with universal precautions for several reasons.
First, the CDC Recommendations are not mandatory as indicated by
the language of the Act, which consistently uses "should" rather than
"shall." ' Consequently, there is "no unwavering obedience" of
HCWs to adhere to the universal precautions. 4 Second, the CDC
Recommendations and the Act do not dictate any legal consequences for HCWs, health care institutions, or licensing boards for
failing to adhere to them. They merely punish states financially for
declining either to adopt the CDC Recommendations or devise their

Similar to the voluntary approach, the mandatory approach requires adherence
to universal precautions and recommends refraining from invasive procedures if
the HCW is infected with dermatitis or lesions. See id. § 10:16. Contrary to the voluntary approach, the mandatory approach would require (1) HCWs to submit to
routine mandatory testing as enforced by the state health department and licensing
board, (2) panel review procedures to be established by the State Department of
Health (DOH), (3) HCWs to comply with the DOH's decisions, or be disciplined,
and (4) HIV-infected HCWs to report their status. See id. HCWs' reassignments
would occur based on protocols established by professional organizations, employers, or facilities. See id. Liability could be imposed on members of review panels or
professional organizations. See id. In addition, "downstream liability" could be imposed on institutions, facilities, employers, and agencies for failure to comply. See
id.
In August 1991, the American Hospital Association (AHA) advocated adhering
to CDC Recommendations and following a more voluntary-oriented approach. See
id. § 10:17. The AHA criticized mandatory routine testing of those HCWs who adhere to universal precautions and who do not perform exposure-prone invasive
procedures. See id. The AHA, however, acknowledged that the testing of patients or
HCWs "should occur only after consideration of legal and ethical issues, and only
with informed consent, notification of test results, counseling, and the maintenance
of confidentiality of information .... " Id. (enumerating situations where testing for
HIV may be appropriate). Further, the AlIA provided some guidance for assembling an expert review panel. See id. In addition, the AHA delineated the appropriate criteria for evaluating infected HCWs' "fitness for duty." See id. Overall, the
AHA sought to balance the confidentiality of HCWs while providing patients with
appropriate information to comprehend the implication of exposure. See id.
See CDC Recommendations, supra note 68,
at 5.
94 See Kenneth R. Courington et al., Universal PrecautionsAre
Not Universally Followed, 126 ARcH. SuRG. 93, 94-95 (1991) (noting an overall infraction rate of 57% in
one study and 58% in another and documenting the observed infraction rates by
area: 75% occurring in the operating room, 75% occurring in the surgical intensive care unit (ICU), and 30% occurring in the surgical ward). The study revealed
that in the surgical context infractions stemmed from the failure of HCWs to use
gloves. See id. at 95. The second infraction rate (58%) occurred even though researchers informed the participants of the initial infraction rate. See id. at 93
(noting the participants believed that study was a one-time intervention).
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own policies. 95 Third, states' recommendations can actually be less
stringent than the federal guidelines because the CDC Recommendations are not a requirement but rather a suggestion, leaving patients with even less protection.96 Fourth, as the CDC acknowledges
and as evidenced by over fifty HCWs contracting HIV on the job, latex barriers are not foolproofY9 As will be discussed in Parts III and
IV, the CDC Recommendations do not encourage compliance; indeed, physicians continue to perform invasive, exposure-prone procedures despite their HIV status.
No clear mandates to prevent HCW-to-patient transmission have
been promulgated by the CDC since its 1991 Recommendations. In
September 1997, however, the CDC published a notice of its draft of
guidelines for infection control in HCWs and requested comments."
The revised infection control guidelines are scheduled for publication in February 1998.Y9 The draft indicated that the CDC is currently "in the process of reviewing relevant data" regarding HCW-topatient transmission policies." ° In the interim, Part IV of this Note
recommends more specific guidelines to prevent HCWs from transmitting HIV to patients.
II. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW AND HIV-INFECTED HEALTH CARE
WORKERS

Since the onset of AIDS in the United States in 1981, discrimination that accompanies the negative stereotypes surrounding the
disease has harmed those who are HIV-infected as well as the public
at large.'0 ' For example, the CDC's first report of AIDS noted that
See 42 U.S.C. § 300ee-2 (1998) (effective Oct. 28, 1991).
See generally supra notes 71-79 (discussing the CDC Recommendations and the
decision by the CDC not to make the CDC Recommendations mandatory); CDC
Recommendations, supranote 68.
97 See Closen, supra note 24, at 83 (noting that "universal precautions
did not
prevent the transmission to 50 to 100 or more health care workers who have contracted HIV from patients."). See Part I.B of this Note (providing statistics of number of infected HCWs).
See 62 Fed. Reg. 47276 (1997) (requesting comments by October 17, 1997).
See CDC Issuing New HCW Infection Control Guidelines to Protect Staff and Patients,
Hosp. INFECTION CoNTROL, (American Health Consultants), Jan. 1998, at I (noting
that the report will be published in both the AmericanJournalof Infection Control and
Infection Control and HospitalEpidemiology).
10062 Fed. Reg. at 47279.
101See Wendy E. Parmet & Daniel J. Jackson, No Longer Disabled: The Legal Impact
of the New Social Construction of HI, 23 Am.J.L. & MED.7, 10-11 (1997) (discussing
how public perceptions or "social constructions" define societal, medical, and legal
reactions regarding the disease). The hysteria that accompanied the HIV epidemic
limited rational public health strategies. See id. at 10. The negative stereotypes that
95
96
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the disease had afflicted five men, all of whom were gay, 0 2 leading to
the misnomer of the "gay plague."'" In the mid-1980s the high-risk
group status expanded to Haitians and intravenous drug users, solidifying negative stereotypes associated with both groups and implying that the disease affected only immigrants or addicts.' 4 When it
was discovered that the disease was sexually transmitted, the public
dismissed the disease as one that afflicted moral outcasts who engaged in deviant behavior.'05 Finally, in 1985, Ryan White, a schoolaged hemophiliac who was infected after a blood transfusion, humanized AIDS as the world watched his school district deny him entry to the classroom based on his infection."
Nonetheless, anyone with HIV remained stigmatized and at risk
of being discriminated against based on unfounded fears regarding
HIV transmission. HIV-positive children were excluded from attending schools and HIV-positive employees were terminated from their
jobs."7 For recourse from this type of discrimination, victims looked
to two federal acts° 08 -the Rehabilitation Act of 197309 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.110
A. Section 504 of the RehabilitationAct and the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct
Both section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA protect
one who "(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an
impairment.""' These statutes differ, however, in that section 504
accompanied HIV and the fears regarding transmission deterred people from being
tested and, if infected, counseled for the disease. See id.
102 See id. at 9.
10"

Id.
See id. (citing Janet L. Dolgin, AIDS: Social Meanings and Legal Ramifications,
14 HoFsrA L. REv. 193, 197 (1985)).
105 See id.
106 See id. at 10.
107 SeeParmet &Jackson, supra note 101, at 10.
108 See discussion infra Part II.A. HIV-infected victims also employed state anti104

discrimination laws, which are not addressed in this Note. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:5-1 et seq. (West 1998).
109 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 706(8), 794 (1998).
110 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1998).
11129 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1998); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The second
category, which protects individuals who have a record of an impairment, reflects the
Act's goal of protecting people from fears and stereotypes. See 29 U.S.C. §
706(8) (B); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (B). The third category, which protects those who
are regarded as having a substantially limiting impairment, also protects a person
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2
restricts only those entities that receive federal financial assistance"
from discriminating against a "qualified individual with handicaps... solely by reason of her or his handicap."'" In addition, the
ADA is significantly more expansive because it applies to both public
and private employers." 4 Of particular relevance to this Note, Title I
of the ADA addresses employment rights."'
After a disability has been established, the next stepis premised
on whether the disability "substantially impairs"" 6 or "substantially
limits"" 7 a major life activity" 8 based on an individualized inquiry."9
In conducting this analysis, however, both the ADA and section 504
provide an exception that allows people to make disability-based determinations if the impairment poses a "significant threat" to others. 20 Specifically, employers are permitted to exclude employees

from fears and stereotypes based on misperceptions, even if the person has no impairment. Se29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (B); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (C).
112 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 794 (limiting the dictates of the Act to "program[s] or
activit[ies] receiving Federal financial assistance) with 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)
(applying the ADA to employers "engaged in an industry affecting commerce").
3 29 U.S.C. § 794. Under the ADA, a qualified individual
is one "who, with or
without a reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions" of the
current or desiredjob. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (8).
4See
42 U.S.C. § 12111(5). There are two employers exempted from the ADA's
reach. See id. An exception is made for corporations wholly owned by the United
States or an Indian Tribe. See id. The statute also does not extend to bona fide private membership clubs, which are tax exempt labor organizations. See id.
115 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117; et seq. Title II covers public transportation and
other state and local government services that include licensing boards. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 12131-12150. Title III includes public accommodations and services operated by private entities such as hotels and movie theaters. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1218112189. Title IV addresses telecommunications, see 47 U.S.C. § 225 (1998), and Title
V addresses miscellaneous issues such as the EEOC guidelines. See 42 U.S.C. §§
12201-12213.
116 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A).
1
29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (B). In its interpretative guidelines, the EEOC defines a
substantial limitation as one that precludes an individual from performing any major life activity that an average person would be capable of performing, or one that
significantly restricts the "condition, manner or duration under which an individual
can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the" average person. 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1) (i), (ii) (1998).
18 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A); 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B). The EEOC guidelines
define a major life activity to include "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(i) (1998).
119 In determining individualized injury, courts should review both the nature
and the severity of the condition, the expected duration of existence, and the longterm significance of the limitation. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2) (iii) (1998).
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b); 29 U.S.C. § 706(D); see also EEOC
Regulations, 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1998) (recommending the four-part balancing test adopted in
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987)).

1018

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 28:1000

who "pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals
in the workplace."2
In such a case, employees are deemed not
"otherwise qualified" under section 504 and further they cannot
"perform the essential functions of the employment" regardless of
reasonable accommodation as required under the ADA. '
Under
both statutes, however, the EEOC requires that the disability pose a
"significant risk of substantial harm."'
Courts' interpretations of
whether HIV risks meet this standard have varied, as will be demonstrated in Part II.D. Before addressing whether HIV constitutes a
significant threat, Part II.B will address whether contagious diseases
are protected disabilities.
B.

ContagiousDiseases as Disabilities

In 1987, the United States Supreme Court decided in School
Board v. Arline 24 that a teacher who suffered from tuberculosis, a contagious disease, was a handicapped individual within the meaning of
the Rehabilitation Act. 25 Gene Arline had taught in New York's Nassau County public school system from 1966 until 1979; the school
district discharged her after her third relapse of tuberculosis within
two years. 2 , In analyzing Arline's claim under section 504 of the Act,
the Court reviewed the regulations promulgated by the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) to determine whether Arline
suffered a physical impairment.'" Because Arline had tuberculosis
that required hospitalization in 1957, the Court concluded that she
had a record of impairment, placing her within a protected class under section 504.128
1

42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).

42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). An employer may be excused from providing a reasonable accommodation by transferring the employee or restructuring the job. See 42
U.S.C. § 12111(9). This exception applies only when making a reasonable accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer's normal business operations. See42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).
123 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1998) (noting that there must be a substantial
harm
that has a high probability of occurring).
124 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
125 See id. at 289.
126 See id. at 276.
12 See id. at 280. HHS defines physical impairment
as
any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine.
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (2) (i) (a) (1998).
128 See Arline, 480 U.S. at 281.
12
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In remanding to the district court, the Court articulated the appropriate individualized inquiry for determining whether Arline was
"otherwise qualified" for her job as an elementary school teacher."2
The Court sought to balance legitimate concerns regarding Arline's
contagiousness against section 504's goal of protecting handicapped
individuals from "deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes or unfounded fear.... .""o
Based on the AMA's amicus curiae brief, the Court articulated a
four-prong test.]" The test, based on reasonable medical opinions
given current medical information, considered (1) the type of risk or
how transmission occurs, (2) the duration or term of that risk or how
long a person is infectious, (3) the severity of the risk based on the
potential harm to others, and (4) the probability that transmission
will occur causing a myriad of harms."
After determining whether the person poses significant health
and safety risks, the Court required an evaluation of whether the individual was "otherwise qualified.""' In the analysis, the Court recognized that an individual who does pose a "significant risk" of
transmitting an infectious disease to others in the workplace is not
"otherwise qualified.., if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate that risk.""" Therefore, under Arline's four-part balancing test,
discrimination against an individual with a contagious disease does
not constitute disability discrimination if a reasonable, accommodation will not protect others from the significant health and safety
risks.' On remand, the district court concluded that Arline did not
pose a "significant risk" or "direct threat" of transmitting tuberculosis
to the children in the Nassau County elementary schools because she
did not have active, contagious tuberculosis."6 The court deemed
Arline "otherwise qualified" and ordered reinstatement.'"'
In dicta, the Supreme Court explained the importance of protecting handicapped individuals from disability discrimination, emphasizing Congress's recognition that "society's accumulated myths
and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the

See id. at 287.
ISO Id.
"n

See id. at 288.
See id. (relying on the standard articulated in the AMA's amicus curiae brief).
"'
See id. at 287.
14 Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.16.
"'

2

I" See id.
13 See Rubin, supra note
8, at 419-20.
137 See id.
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physical limitations that flow from actual impairment."'3 In addition, the Court noted that few conditions of handicap cause as much
public fear and apprehension as contagious diseases. Although the
Court explicitly discussed how contagious diseases give rise to discrimination, it declined to examine the question of whether someone who carries the HIV virus is physically impaired.'4 Generally,
however, courts have concluded that HIV constitutes a disability under section 504.14 In addition, in 1988, the United States Department of Justice declared that individuals who are HIV-infected are
disabled under section 504 because the disease manifests itself in
physical impairments that substantially limit major life activities such
as breathing, talking, seeing, or walking. 2 Based on those conclusions, various states have classified AIDS and HIV as protected disabilities in antidiscrimination statutes. 43 The challenge is for the
HIV-infected individual to rebut a defendant's defense that the
plaintiff posed a "significant threat" to the health and safety of others.
In 1987, Congress passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act,'"
which sought to codify the "significant risk" test articulated in Arline.4 " Specifically, Congress "added a provision to section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act stating that persons with 'contagious diseases or
infections' are not covered under section 504 if they pose a 'direct
threat to the health or safety of other individuals.'"'" Thus, if an employer cannot eliminate the "significant risk" by reasonable accommodation, the employee will not be "otherwise qualified."47 Although codification of the Arline standard did not provide a
Arline, 480 U.S. at 284.
See id.
140 See id. at 282 n.7; see also Chalk v. United States, 840 F.2d 701, 704,
711 (9th
Cir. 1988) (finding an AIDS-infected teacher qualified to teach hearing-impaired
children because there was no evidence of a "significant risk" to children and because to hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of section 504 that seeks to dispel
unfounded prejudices).
141 See Rubin, supra note 8, at 417-18 n.167 (citing Ray v. Desoto County
Sch.
Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1538 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (finding three hemophiliac brothers protected under the Rehabilitation Act and requiring their readmission to the
Desoto County schools)).
1
See id. at 418; see also 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35 App. A § 35.104 (1998).
4
See Rubin, supra note 8, at 418 (citing statutes from Florida, New Jersey, and
West Virginia).
144See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1998).
145See CalmingAIDS Phobia, supranote 5,
at 752.
146Id. (emphasis added). Despite this mandate, section 504 does not
provide a
definition of "direct threat." See id. at 754.
147 See id. at 753.
'39
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definition of "direct threat," the ADA defines "direct threat" as one
that poses a "significant risk to the health or safety of others that
cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation."* As will be
discussed in Part II.D, much of the debate in disability case law regarding HIV revolves around how precisely to quantify and qualify
what constitutes a "significant risk." Before parsing out those concepts, the next section addresses whether asymptomatic, rather than
symptomatic, HIV constitutes a disability.
C.

Whether Asymptomatic HIV Constitutes a Disability

Although the legislative history of the ADA demonstrates that
AIDS is a protected disability, a debate has emerged as to whether
asymptomatic HIV constitutes a disability. This controversy has only
recently evolved because of technological advances such as protease
inhibitors, 49 which reduce traces of HIV to undetectable levels.
Consequently, an individual with HIV can live for years without
exhibiting symptoms.'50
In 1997, decisions from the United States Courts of Appeals for
the First and Fourth Circuits demonstrated that the circuits are divided regarding the issue. In March, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held in Abbott v. Bragdon511 that a woman's
asymptomatic, HIV status constituted a physical impairment that
substantially limited a major life activity-the ability to reproduce.' 2
5 the United States
Five months later in Runnebaum v. NationsBank,"
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held in an eight to four decision that an asymptomatic, HIV-positive man was not physically impaired because reproduction did not constitute a major life activity."
Further, the Fourth Circuit commented that the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that he declined to engage in a major life activity."', Essentially, the different outcomes are premised on the courts' analyses

14

42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (1998).

See supra note 23 and accompanying text (describing protease inhibitors).
JN See RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 11 (noting that, although individuals
may remain symptom free for two to ten years, such individuals are contagious durinq the latency period).
1'
107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S.Ct. 554 (1997).
149

'5

See id. at 949.

13 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
1
See id. at 172 (noting that "nothing inherent in the infection actually prevents
either procreation or intimate sexual relations for the purposes of the ADA"). The
Fourth Circuit noted that the statute specifically addressed the physical impairment
itself-not the individual's response to the impairment. See id.
155

See id.
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of whether reproduction is a major life activity and whether that activity's impairment is based on the existence of HIV or merely one's
reaction to the disease.
In Abbott, the First Circuit acknowledged that reproduction is
not mentioned specifically in the EEOC Regulations, which enumerate functions such as walking, seeing, hearing, learning, and working. T5 Nonetheless, the court concluded that reproduction "fits
comfortably within its sweep" because it is one of the most natural
In contrast, based on Webster's Dictionary's
major life functions.'"
definition of "major,"' the Fourth Circuit concluded that reproduction was not the type of activity contemplated by Congress, even
though the court acknowledged that procreation and intimate sexual relations are affected by HIV and that procreation constitutes a
fundamental human activity.'59 Consequently, the Runnebaum dissent
15

157

See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 940 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998)).
Id. The decision in Abbott is consistent with the EEOC Guidelines, which state

that if reproduction is impaired then the reproductive system is impaired. See Gary
D. Friedman & Joyce Phillips, Is Fertility an ADA Disability'? If Reproduction is Deemed
a Major Life Activity, Employers' Insurance Costs May Escalate, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 24, 1997,
3. Abbott, however, does not signify that the inability to conceive constitutes a per se
disability, but rather that HIV impairs the reproductive system because of the contagious nature of the disease. See id. This interpretation is also consistent with case
law. See id. Compare Erickson v. Board of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316, 322-23 (N.D.
Ill. 1995) (finding that plaintiff with a reproductive disability stated a claim under
the ADA and holding that discharge for missing workdays while she pursued
lengthy infertility treatments violated the ADA) and Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co.,
858 F. Supp. 1393, 1396-97, 1405 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (same) with Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding in part that employer's
denial of insurance coverage for infertility treatments did not violate ADA because
plaintiff's inability to conceive did not prevent her from performing dudes as a respiratory therapist and because employer did not disparately treat plaintiff based on
her gender) and Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La.
1995), aff'd, 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that, because television anchor's
inability to conceive does not constitute a disability, employer is not required to accommodate in the absence of a disability). The Department ofJustice also supports
the conclusion that asymptomatic and symptomatic HIV limit the major life activity
of reproduction based on the fear of transmitting HIV to a fetus and discourages
people from engaging in intimate sexual relations. See Department of Justice
Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. Pt. 36 App. § 36.104 (1998).
15
See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 170 (noting that Webster's Dictionaty defines major
as "demanding great attention or concern ... greater in dignity, rank, importance
or interest").
159 See id. at 170-71 (citing Krauel 95 F.3d at 677). The Runnebaum court also
compared Krauel with Abbott, 107 F.3d at 941 (concluding that procreation is covered under the ADA); McWright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222, 226-27 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding, under the Rehabilitation Act, that an employer failed to make a reasonable accommodation for employee to pursue fertility treatments that interfered with
her work schedule); and Zatarain,881 F. Supp. at 243 (holding that plaintiff did not
have impairment of the reproductive system).
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vehemently rebuked the majority's conclusion that procreation was
not a major life activity and classified it as "perhaps the most important life activity, since we would cease to exist as a species if we no
longer reproduced."' 6" Chastising the majority for creating a per se
rule that asymptomatic H1V is never protected under the ADA, the
dissent reiterated that the majority's conclusion was inapposite to
the statutory text, medical findings, legislative history, administrative
regulations, and the Fourth Circuit's earlier decision in Ennis v. National Association of Business & Educational Radio, Inc., ' which required a case-by-case analysis.'6 2 Consequently, the dissent concluded
that the majority's decision constituted an inappropriate, outright
repeal of the ADA, which Congress enacted to curb discrimination
against people who suffer from asymptomatic HIV.'6 3
The circuits also differed as to whether reproduction was substantially impaired by HIV. Relying on EEOC regulations'" and judicial authority,'65 the First Circuit concluded that HIV substantially
impaired one of Abbott's major life activities because the disease had
a profound effect on her ability to engage in intimate sexual relations, gestation, childbearing, child rearing, and nurturing familial
relations.'" Rejecting the assertion that the plaintiffs reproductive
system was impaired because of her choice not to procreate or engage in sexual relations, 67 the court concluded that HIV substantially
Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 184 (Michael, C.J., dissenting) (citing Abbott, 107 F.3d
at 940).
1
53 F.3d 55, 60, 61-62 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that an employee did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA based on her son's HIV
status and fear of medical treatment being too costly because the court rejected a
per se rule that HIV-infected individuals are disabled and evidence in the record
that indicated herjob performance justified her termination).
62, See Runnebaurm, 123 F.3d at 186 (Michael,
C.J., dissenting).
160

163

See id.

28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998).
See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that classification of asymptomatic and symptomatic 1HV as a disability is consistent with the
holdings of School Board of Nassau County v. Arline and Chalk v. United States).
I6 See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 942 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S.
Ct. 554 (1997).
167 See id.; see also Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F.
Supp. 1393, 1405 (N.D. Ill.
1994) (holding that reproduction is a major life activity and finding that reproductive disorders qualify as physical impairments under the Rehabilitation Act). But see
Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that
choices governing reproduction and sexual relations are lifestyle choices and are
distinguishable from breathing, walking, and other major life activities described in
the EEOC Guidelines); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243
(E.D. La. 1995), aft'd, 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the analyses governing physical impairments and major life activities are analytically distinct com4See
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limits a "fecund woman's major life activity of reproduction,"'" making Abbott disabled under the ADA. 169 Consequently, the First Circuit held that Bragdon's170refusal to provide routine dental care to
Abbott violated the ADA.
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit refused to acknowledge that a
person's reaction to his impairment, which leads to behavior modifications pertaining to major life activities, serves to create a statutory
disability.1 7 1 Although the court recognized that asymptomatic, HIVinfected individuals may refrain from engaging in procreation or
sexual relations because of the fear that offspring or a partner may
become infected, the court concluded that there was "nothing inherent in the virus [that] substantially limits procreation or intimate
sexual relations."' Consequently, the court concluded that Runnebaum failed to demonstrate that he was disabled under the ADA.'
Both decisions are flawed.' 4 The Fourth Circuit decision is
troubling because it disregarded legal findings based on medical
evidence that the actual physical impairment of the individual is not
the primary issue, but "rather the issue is the contagious effect of the
ponents of the ADA' s definition of disability).
16 Abbott, 107 F.3d at 942. The court also rejected the respondent's
assertion
that Abbott's reproductive activity was not substantially limited, given that if she
took AZT there would be only an 8% chance of transmission. See id.
169 See id. As to the "direct threat" exception, the court concluded
that Bragdon
could not seek shelter under this safe-harbor provision. See id. at 948, 949. Recognizing that these cases are fact sensitive, the court noted that because Abbott required only a simple procedure, Bragdon failed to provide evidence of a direct
threat of physician to patient transmission. See id. at 949. The court, however, prefaced its conclusion with the disclaimer that its holding did not "eschew[ I a blanket
rule" and that the ADA analysis continues to require a case-by-case inquiry. See id.
170 See id. (noting that impartial observers have reason to empathize with
Abbott
and Bragdon).
1
See Runnebaum v. NationsBank, 123 F.3d 156, 172 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
17'
Id.
173 See id. at 174. The court also concluded that
Runnebaum failed to demonstrate that the employer discriminated against him because of his disability, particularly because of his performance deficiencies. See id. at 175. In addition to failing
on his ADA claim, Runnebaum's ERISA claim failed even though he asserted that
by firing him the bank interfered with his ability to pay for AZT, which had been
covered under the employer's health insurance plan. See id. at 163, 175. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of NationsBank. See id.at 176.
174 Despite their shortcomings, the dispositions
in Runnebaum and Abbott are
relevant to the issue of whether asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals are protected
under the ADA. One hopes that the Supreme Court will settle the dispute in the
circuits regarding HIV as a disability. See supra note 46. Although the issue of
whether asymptomatic HIV constitutes a disability is pertinent to individuals who
are HIV-positive, the debate regarding HIV-infected HCWs centers upon whether
they pose a "significant risk" to others despite being asymptomatic.
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HIV virus."'75 At the onset, HIV is a retrovirus that penetrates the individual's immune system and leads to a gradual but inevitable disarmament of the immunological defenses. " ' Because individuals are
impaired immediately upon infection and because potential transmission is the basis of disability, there is no distinction for purposes
of disability law between asymptomatic and symptomatic individuals-both categories are protected under the ADA.' 77 In short, because of the Fourth Circuit's misinterpretation of the ADA, misplaced reliance on factually distinct case law, and disregard of prior
case law and EEOC guidelines, Runnebaum should not be afforded
significant weight when analyzing disability law.
In comparison, however, Abbott is flawed because the court's
conclusion-that the plaintiff decided not to have children because
of her HIV status-protects only women who have the capacity to reproduce. 78 For example, Abbott does not protect homosexual men
who can never reproduce with their partners or post-menopausal
women who cannot conceive a child.'9 Although the Abbott court
conducted the prerequisite individualized analysis and concluded
that Abbott was protected "based in large part on the fortuity of her
own fertility,"' 80 the First Circuit's decision does not provide broad
protection under the ADA. Consequently, to protect the widest
range of disabled people, courts should recognize that asymptomatic
HIV substantially impairs the ability to engage in reproductive activities because of the risk of transmission, rather than limiting Protection to those individuals with specific intentions to reproduce.
As noted earlier, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to Abbott in November 1997.' 2 Therefore, the Court has the
opportunity to address whether asymptomatic HIV constitutes a disability and whether a physician must treat an HIV patient.'s3 As to
Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994).
See id. (citing Chalk v. United States, 840 F.2d 701, 706 (9th Cir. 1988)); see
also Runnebaur, 123 F.3d at 180-81 (Michael, C.J., dissenting) (noting that in
asymptomatic stages of HIV infection the disease attacks the lymph system).
See Gates, 39 F.3d at 1446 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(4) (1) (ii) (1998)).
178 Cf International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991)
(holding that a gender-specific fetal protection policy in the workplace violated Title VII because (1) it only protected women and (2) the employer did not offer a
bona fide occupational qualification as a defense).
179 See Parmet &Jackson, supra note 101, at 35-36.
'89 Id. at 35.
181 See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 185 (Michael, C.J., dissenting).
175

176

182

118 S. Ct. 554 (1997).

See supra note 46 (stating the issues for which the Supreme Court granted certiorari).
10
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the second issue, the Court's disposition could have a profound effect on patients' rights in terms of the duty to treat and informed
consent. On one hand, patients' rights could be restricted if the
Court concludes that physicians do not have a duty to treat HIVinfected patients or that patients must disclose their HIV status.'"
On the other hand, patients' rights could be expanded if the Court
decides that physicians should be required to disclose their HIV
status to patients.
D. Why the "SignificantRisk" or "DirectThreat" Test Has Been
Inconsistently Applied to Individuals with HIlV
According to the EEOC, 85 the legal standard for determining
whether an individual should be discharged because of a disability is
premised upon whether a worker or employer has a "reasonable belief based on objective evidence that (1) leads to a suspicion that a
worker might pose a direct threat in the workplace; or (2) arises because of suspicion that the worker cannot perform the essential
88
functions of ajob."1
As to the first consideration, whether HIV-infected persons pose
a "significant risk" or "direct threat" to others, courts have retreated
from the Arline balancing test'7 and recently have employed a more
stringent test, which requires individuals to demonstrate that they do
not pose any risk of transmitting the virus.'" Two waves of cases exemplify the shift." The first set of cases involves courts granting protection to HIV-infected individuals because the risk posed to others
was characterized as minimal. 90 These cases, however, occurred be18

See supra note 93 (noting that AHA recommends HIV testing of patients in

certain condition but rejects mandatory testing of HCWs).
8 See Fair Employment Practice (123) (Oct. 16, 1997) (on file with the Seton
Hall Law Raiew).
In Id.
18 See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 599-600.
18 See id.
188 See id. at 618-43.
190

See id. at 627-39. The first wave is characterized by four cases. See id. at 627; see

also Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1502, 1504 (11th Cir. 1988) (acknowledging
lower court's finding that the risk of a child transmitting HIV in the educational setting was a "remote theoretical possibility"); Chalk v. United States, 840 F.2d 701,
707 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that school teacher who had AIDS posed a "minimal
risk" to children); Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440,
445 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that HIV-infected child did not pose a "significant
risk" to other children); Clover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation, 686 F. Supp. 243, 351 (D. Neb. 1988), aff'd, 867 F.2d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 1989)
(holding that mandatory HIV testing was unnecessary because the risk of transmission to residents was "trivial," "extremely low," and "theoretical"). There was also a
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fore the "remote" possibility of HIV transmission from HCW to patient became a reality with the Acer cluster.]'' Four of the five cases
within the second wave involved HCWs, but none required a showing
of a "significant risk.""" Rather, the courts equated any risk of trans-

mission as a "significant risk" given that AIDS is fatal.
In 1990, the second wave of cases began with Leckelt v. Board of
Commissioners.' In Leckelt, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit upheld the discharge of a nurse who refused to submit

results of an HIV test, thereby preventing the hospital from determining how best to comply with the CDC Recommendations.
In
addition to concluding that the hospital did not discriminate against
Leckelt solely because of his handicap,' " the court found that he was
not "otherwise qualified" to perform his duties because he failed to
comply with the 1,hospital's
policy for monitoring HIV and other in96
fectious diseases.
Emphasizing that high-risk employees often fail
to comply with the CDC Recommendations, the court held that the
opportunity for infection "far outweighed" the employee's privacy
interests.'97 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit held that the hospital did
not violate section 504.198
HCW case in 1988 in which a consent decree in the Illinois District Court provided
that an HIV-infected neurologist whose privileges were suspended could be
"reasonably accommodated" by requiring added precautions, namely that he wear
double gloves. See Rubin, supra note 8, at 420-21.
notes 6-10 and accompanying text (discussing Acer cluster).
See
91
.
Seesupra
infra notes 193-228 and accompanying text for a discussion of the second
wave of cases.
'9- 714 F. Supp. 1377, 1389 (E.D. La. 1989), aff'd, 909 F.2d 820, 821 (5th Cir.
1990).
'" The hospital infection control practitioner investigated Leckelt after his
roommate of eight years died of AIDS and reports began circulating that an unidentified, gay nurse was HrV-positive. See Leckelt, 909 F.2d at 822. After the practitioner suspected Leckelt and requested that he submit to an HIV test, Leckelt informed the practitioner that he was awaiting results of an HIV test. See id. at 822-23.
Leckelt agreed to provide the practitioner with his results when he received them.
See id. at 823. During that conversation, Leckelt informed the infection control staff
person of his draining lesion. See id. In response, the practitioner forbade Leckelt
from returning to work until he secured a medical clearance from his doctor. See id.
Later, the practitioner also learned of Leckelt's status as a HBV carrier who had a
history of syphilis. See id. After two weeks of trying to acquire Leckelt's test results,
the hospital discharged Leckelt for his "failure to comply with hospital policies-namely failure to submit the test results" and failure to inform the practitioner of his refusal. Id. at 824. The court supported the hospital's conduct and reiterated that "a hospital has the right to require such testing ... in order to fulfill an
obligation to its employees and to the public." Id.
195 See id. at 826.
196 See id. at 830.
197 See id. at 832.
19 See id. at 833 (holding in part that the hospital did not violate the Louisiana
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In 1991, a NewJersey court held in Estate of Behringer v. Medical
CenteP9 that an HIV-infected otolaryngologist/plastic surgeon posed
a "reasonable probability of substantial harm" because he performed
invasive procedures."O Further, the court acknowledged that actual
exposure was not the only concern because
patients would also suf20 1
fer the stress of post-exposure testing.
Later that year, in Doe v. Washington University,20 2 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri found, given
the frequency of self-injury and the potential for subsequent exposure to patients, a dental student was not "otherwise qualified" because he could not meet his credential requirements without performing invasive procedures. 2 ' Relying on CDC studies regarding
the Acer cluster and the likelihood of injury,m the court concluded
that substantial deference should be given2 to the academic decision
that the probability of harm was too great. 05
Relying on the Washington University analysis, a Pennsylvania
court decided In re Milton S. Hershey Medical Center.2 The court determined that the hospital's decision to reveal the HIV status of an
obstetrics/gynecology surgical resident was appropriate after the
resident admitted exposing a patient to HIV when he accidentally

Civil Rights for Handicapped Act, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or Leckelt's right to privacy under both the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments). As to the search and seizure analysis, the court concluded that the
government's strong interest in maintaining a safe workplace outweighed the limited invasion of Leckelt's privacy, in part because of the hospital's compelling interest in protecting its employees and patients from HIV. See id. at 831-32 (citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (holding
that suspicionless drug testing of United States Customs Service employees is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because they intercept drugs, carry firearms,
and access sensitive information)).
1" 249 N.J. Super. 597, 592 A.2d 1251 (Law Div. 1991). For a discussion
of this
case in the informed consent context, see Part III of this Note.
Estate of Behringer, 249 NJ. Super at 657, 658, 592 A.2d
at 1283 (noting that
where the ultimate harm is death the low possibility of transmission suffices to preclude a surgeon from performing invasive procedures if there is any risk of transmission).
201 See id. at 651, 592 A.2d
at 1279.
202 780 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
203 See id. at 633. The hospital offered a reasonable accommodation
by allowing
the student to perform his requirements at an AIDS clinic and offering him opportunities in other medical programs at the university that did not require performing
invasive procedures. See id. at 630.
2N4 See id. at 633.
205 See id. at 631.
595 A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. CL 1991), aff'd, 634 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1993). For a
discussion of this case in the informed consent context, see Part III of this Note.
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cut his surgical glove during an invasive procedure." ' Because he
performed invasive procedures and a potential for actual transmission existed," 8 the court concluded that the resident presented a
health risk to his patients.2 Although this decision is not addressed
specifically in the second wave of cases, it is consistent with the shift
from a "significant risk" to an "any risk" analysis.
In 1993, in Bradley v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center,210 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found
an HIV-positive surgical technician not "otherwise qualified."2 1 ' The
court also held that the hospital's reassignment of the technician to
the purchasing department did not constitute disability-based discrimination.2 Under the Arline analysis, the court focused on the
probability that Bradley could transmit the disease and cause harm21 3
even though the risk was small.214 The court stated that "[a] cognizable risk of permanent duration with lethal consequences suffices to
make a surgical technician not 'otherwise qualified.'" 21 5 The court
further noted that the hospital could not make "'reasonable accommodation' to eliminate the risks connected with the 'essential functions'" of being a surgical technician because only removal would
eliminate the risk. 216 Therefore, the court found reassignment appropriate, noting that the hospital had no duty to reassign Bradley to
a particular position.1
Similarly, in Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp.,21 8 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held in 1994 that
a hospital's refusal to allow an HIV-positive surgeon to treat patients
did not violate the Rehabilitation Act.21 9 The court explained that
207

See id. at 1296; see also Doe v. University of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d

1261, 1266 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that HIV-infected neurosurgical resident posed
a "significant risk to the health and safety of patients" given the exposure-prone
procedures he performed).

See Hershey, 595 A.2d at 1296.
209 See id. at 1298 (noting that the resident posed a risk to other surgeons'
pa208

tients as well).
2,0 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
211 See id. at 925.
212

See id. at 923.
See id . a t 9 24 .

214

See id. (focusing on the "catastrophic consequences" of transmission).

215

Id. (citations omitted).

2,
2

Bradley, 3 F.3d at 925.
See id.

218

887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994).

219

See id. at 772.

213

The surgeon also brought suit under the ADA.

claim failed for the same reasons.

See id. This

See id. It should be noted, however, that Dr.
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the surgeon posed a "significant risk" to his patients for three reasons. First, no cure for AIDS exists.22 Second, each time he performs an invasive procedure, the patient is at risk.2I Third, although
people may live for years after exposure, death is inevitable.2m Consequently, an HIV-infected surgeon cannot be "otherwise qualified"
under either of the federal disability statutes or present medical
standards. Although this case is not classified specifically within the
second wave of cases, Scoles demonstrates that, given the fatal nature
of AIDS, any risk of transmission is significant.
The second wave of cases reflects the ambiguity in the statutory
definition of "significant risk. " 2n This uncertainty is based upon the
conflict between an analysis based on scientific facts, which show that
HIV transmission is unlikely, and a normative values approach,
which reflects real concerns that transmission results in fatality

2

4

In

this context, "significant risk" is a relative term. Therefore, the quantification or qualification of what constitutes a "significant risk" is actually premised on acceptable risks, which are defined according to
both facts and values. 5 As such, a "significant threat" is measured by
scientific evidence of whether the risk is likely to cause harm and
whether individuals view the potential for actual harm as significant.
Concededly, this "any risk" formulation may deprive people with
contagious diseases of the rights secured in Arline."s Although current case law may not be wholly consistent with Congress's intent to
protect people with HIV from discrimination, patients' rights should
not be compromised simply because Congress has declined to provide additional guidance.m Resolution of this conflict should come
from Congress rather than the courts,228 and if Congress is unable to
devise a solution due to a lack of technical expertise, it should delegate a clear mandate to the CDC.
Because there is no cure for AIDS, any judicial miscalculation
regarding what constitutes a "significant risk" could be fatal. Thus,
courts cannot rely blindly on scientific evidence without regard to
Scoles could have performed invasive procedures if he obtained documentation of
informed consent from all of his patients. See id. The issue of informed consent is
discussed in further detail in Part III of this Note.
no See id.
221 See id.
M See id.
22
See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 643.
24 See id. at 648-49.
See id. at 659.
See id. at 668.
See id.
228 See id. at 688. For further discussion of this view, see Part IV of this Note.
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normative values of what people consider to be a "significant risk."2
50
Public opinion polls suggests that any risk is a "significant risk."M
Therefore, until Congress articulates a more tangible test or clarifies
"significant risk" analysis, HIV-infected HCWs who perform invasive
and exposure-prone procedures should be suspended or terminated
if a reasonable accommodation is not feasible.
III. PATIENT CONCERNS REGARDING INVASIVE, EXPOSURE-PRONE
PROCEDURES: WHY THE RISK OF HIV INFECTION IS MATERIAL AND
THE FEAR OF TRANSMISSION IS REASONABLE

Employees, including HCWs, should be protected from disability discrimination caused by their HIV status. Nonetheless, as indicated by the "direct threat" and "significant risk" language under the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, a HCW's right to be free from discrimination is not absolute. As stated in Part I, there is only one
known incident of HIV transmission from a physician or dentist to a
patient in the United States. Nonetheless, most people would like to
know whether their treating physicians are HIV-positive. ,' The dilemma, however, is premised upon whether a physician has a legal
duty to disclose that information to a patient.23 2 Although a large
portion of this Note speaks generally of statistics involving HCWs,
Part III specifically focuses on physicians, including dentists and surgeons, and discusses whether a patient should be informed of his
physician's HIV status. The intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress torts provides additional areas of debate.
A.

Informed Consent

The doctrine of informed consent is premised on a patient's
right to autonomy and self-determination .23-2 Specifically, the doc-

See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 647-67.
See Closen, supra note 24, at 97-98. Studies indicate that 78% of survey respondents "would either discontinue all treatment with [the] infected [HCW] or
would continue treatment but exclude surgery or other invasive procedures." Id. at
99. Most survey participants believed that HCWs should reveal their HIV status to
patients before treatment. See id. at 98-99. As such data is clearly available, it could
and should be used to provide normative guidance as to what types of risk are acceptable. See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 655.
, See Closen, supra note 24, at 97-100 (citing various opinion polls indicating
that between 80-90% of the public believes that physicians should disclose their HIV
status given the risk of harm to patients).
232 SeeFuRRow rTAL., supra note 14,
at 407.
W See Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
Schoendorffwas one of the first cases to address the issue of informed consent.
20
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trine recognizes that an individual has "a right to be free from nonconsensual interference with his or her business.",3 Generally, informed consent seeks to "protect individual autonomy; protect the
patient's status as a human being; avoid fraud or duress.., and in-

volve the public generally in medicine.,'

As stated in 1972, in one of the most significant informed consent cases, Canterbury v. Spence,"9 the doctrine is based on the notion
that a physician should divulge information that he objectively, not
subjectively, considers to be "material" according to what information a prudent patient would want to make a decision.5 7 In Canterbury, the court defined a risk as being material "'when a reasonable
person, in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient's
position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster
of risks'" when deciding whether to undergo a specific procedure. "
In addition to demonstrating that (1) a specific risk was material, a
patient must demonstrate that (2) a reasonably prudent patient
would have foregone the procedure if informed of the significant
dangers and (3) those risks manifested an actual injury.5 9
As to the first element, the issue of whether a physician's HIV
status is material to the patient's medical decisionmaking is somewhat unusual because the risks are based upon the physician's own
characteristics that, as a general rule, are not considered in the
analysis.'4 The inherent dilemma permeating the issue is whether
physician-risk information, rather than procedure-specific risks, can
be considered.2 4' HIV-infected HCWs should be classified within the
24 FuRRow ET AL., supra note 14, at
397.
235 Id. (citing Alexander Morgan Capron, Informed Consent
in Catastrophic Disease
Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 340, 365-76 (1974)).
2S6464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
237 See id. at 787.
258

Id. (quoting Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed Consent to

Therapy, 64 N.W. U. L. REv. 628, 640 (1970)).

In addition to the Canterburyreason-

able patient standard, there is also a professional disclosure standard. See FuRRow
ETAL., supra note 14, at 406. The professional disclosure standard assesses whether
there is a duty to disclose based on a "reasonable medical practitioner similarly situated." Id. Although states are divided between these standards a "slight majority"
has adopted the professional standard even though the patient standard has secured increased approval. See id.
239

240

Id. at 790-91.
SeeFuRROWETAL., supra note 14, at 418 (discussing the role performance risks

play in determining the risk an HIV-infected physician poses to his patients).
See id. at 417 (citing Kennedy v. St. Charles Gen. Hosp. Auxiliary, 630 So. 2d

888, 892 (La. Ct. App. 1993)). Compare Hales v. Pittman, 576 P.2d 493 (Ariz. 1979)
(holding that defendant doctor's lack of experience and procedure's high risk were
material and should have been disclosed) and Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192,
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physician-specific category of facts subject to disclosure for three reasons. First, HIV is a contagious and fatal disease that causes irreparable harm. 42 Second, the lethal risk depends upon the physician's
HIV status and the procedure involved.2 S Third, in contrast to fatigue or depression, an HIV-infected physician who performs an invasive procedure places a patient at risk of contracting the disease
each time the physician makes an incision, punctures the skin, or
places his hands into a patient's body cavity.2"
Further, HIV is contagious and the risk associated with invasive
procedures make the disease a hybrid between physician-specific and
procedure-specific risks. Specifically, if the physician performs a
non-invasive procedure, there is no material risk in the procedure
despite the physician's HIV status. In contrast, if a physician performs an invasive procedure, his HIV status should be considered a
procedure-specific risk given that the invasive procedure would not
be risky but-for the physician's HIV status, whereas the risk of a physician causing harm based on fatigue or depression exists in every
procedure. Further, as stated by the court in Mauro v. Borgess Medical
Center,245 the appropriate test is whether the risk is avoidable, in the
sense that it could be eliminated by the particular physician foregoing the procedure. 24 Accordingly, because HIV transmission necessarily results in death, the HIV status of a physician should be con1196, 1198 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that physician's failure to disclose alcoholism violated informed consent statute) andJohnson v. Kokemor, 545 N.W.2d 495,
506 (Wis. 1996) (noting that the combination of the procedure's risks and the doctor's inexperience was material and thus disclosure was required) with Omelas v.
Fry, 727 P.2d 819, 823 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (refusing to allow evidence of alcoholism to prove that anesthesiologist was impaired during procedure that resulted in
negligence).
One example of a physician-specific risk is the aging process, which may result
in diminished motor skills decreasing a surgeon's survival rate. See FuRRow ET AL.,
supra note 14, at 417. The informed consent issue concerns whether the surgeon
should be required to disclose his diminishing motor skills even though his record
remains excellent. See id. Typically, institutional peer review and a surgeon's own
integrity would result in an institution declining to credential the surgeon or the
surgeon would voluntarily step down if incompetence existed. See id. at 417-18. Institutional peer review has not been successful, however, in protecting patients from
being exposed to HIV-infected HCWs because of the lack of mandatory testing. See
discussion supra Part II.D and infra Part IV.
242 See supra notes 218-222 and accompanying text (highlighting concerns
that
HIV is fatal).
24S See supra notes 218-222 and accompanying text. But see FuRRow ET AL., supra
note 14, at 418 (positing that disclosing physicians' contagious diseases is different
from performance based or procedure specific risks).
244 See Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 886 F. Supp. 1349, 1353 (W.D. Mich. 1995).
245 886 F. Supp. 1349 (W.D. Mich. 1995).
246 Seid. at 1353.
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sidered material if that physician performs exposure-prone, invasive
procedures.
As to the second element required for an informed consent
claim, people often classify the risk of HIV transmission from a HCW
to be material.247 For instance, ninety percent of those surveyed in
one poll, 28 and eighty percent surveyed in another poll, 2 9 stated that
physicians who are HIV-positive should inform patients of their HIV
status. The respondents in one poll admitted that they would forego
treatment with that physician, or at the least, refuse to permit that
physician to perform any invasive, exposure-prone procedures.2 - Although a patient's refusal would likely result in de facto termination,25' the issue is distinct from whether the risk is material to the
patient. Indeed, termination is an unfortunate consequence for a
physician. Nonetheless, it is the patient's prerogative to refuse
treatment from that physician because patient choice and autonomy
are the essence of the informed consent doctrine.25 2 Further, the risk
of transmission is material as exemplified by the disposition of the
second wave of HIV-disability discrimination cases that classified any
3
risk of transmission as significant.2
The patient-physician relationship exists to serve and protect
the patient's interests,2- not those of the physician. 5 Further, the
physician owes a fiduciary duty to the patient, whereas the patient
does not owe a reciprocal ethical duty to the physician.' Given the
See Closen, supranote 24, at 69.
See id. at 98. That poll also provided evidence that 94% of respondents believed that dentists should inform their patients that they are infected with the HIV
virus. See id. at 97-98.
247
248

249
W

2

See id. at 98.
Seeid. at 99.

See Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 249 N.J. Super. 597, 613, 592
A.2d
1251, 1258 (Law Div. 1991).
SSee supra notes 233-235 and accompanying text. As the Estate
of Behringercourt
commented:
Where the ultimate harm is death, even the presence of a low risk of
transmission justifies the adoption of a policy which precludes invasive
procedures when there is "any" risk of transmission.... If there is to
be an ultimate arbiter of whether the patient is to be treated invasively
by an AIDS-positive surgeon, the arbiter will be the fully-informed patient.
Estate of Behringer,249 N.J. Super. at 657, 592 A.2d at 1283.
2
See discussion supra Part II.D.
See Closen, supra note 24, at 119 (commenting that doctors' elevation of
"selfinterest above patient autonomy" must end).
2"

Seeid. at59.

IN See id. at 119.
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unequal positions in a patient-physician relationship, it is preposterous to place the onus on the patient to ask whether the physician is
HIV-positive, given the inequality of medical knowledge."
The medical profession's promulgation of a "Don't Ask-Don't
Tell"policyu2 constitutes an industry-wide breach of the duty of
As demonstrated in the famous tugboat radio equipment
care.
case, The TJ. Hooper v. Northern Badge Corp., s° that an entire industry

requires a certain standard does not automatically signify that the
requirement does not lag behind in the adoption of new standards. 26 ' AfterJudge Learned Hand conducted an economic analysis
as to whether the probability of loss or harm outweighed the benefit
of requiring radios on tugboats, Judge Hand concluded that the absence of radio equipment was an avoidable risk."6 Although the
CDC does not mandate testing unless it is proven cost-effective," ' a
cost-benefit analysis should not be dispositive as to whether a reasonable patient considers that information to be material.
Further, several cases have concluded that the HIV status of a
physician who practices invasive, exposure-prone procedures is material under the informed consent doctrine. In 1991, a New Jersey
court was the first to address that issue in Estate of Behringerv. Medical
Center.' " After the hospital suspended Behringer's privileges, he
filed suit alleging that the hospital had violated the state's antidiscrimination statute by suspending his privileges and by failing to
maintain confidentiality of his diagnosis and test results. 65 The court
257

See id.

See id. at 79 (analogizing the regulatory scheme to the military's homosexual
reporting policy).
2"59See

id. at 119.

60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
61 See Closen, supranote 24, at 118-19 (citing T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d at 740).
262 See T.J.Hooper, 60 F.2d at
740.
26 See discussion supra Part I.B.2 (discussing CDC Recommendations);
see also
Kathryn A. Phillips et al., The Cost-effectiveness of HIV Testing of Physiciansand Dentists
in the United States, 271 JAMA 851, 851 (1994) (noting the substantial benefits of
mandatory HIV testing of surgeons and dentists). Phillips explained:
[U]nder a medium seroprevalence and transmission risk scenario,
mandatory testing of all surgeons might avert 25 infections at a total
cost of $27.9 million or $1115000 per infection averted and an incremental cost of $291,000 compared with current testing; however, the
incremental cost-effectiveness per patient averted ranges from
$29807000 under a low-risk scenario to a savings of $81000 under a
high risk scenario.
Id.
249 N.J. Super. 597, 657, 592 A.2d 1251, 1283 (Law Div. 1991).
See id. at 605, 592 A.2d at 1254. The physician was rushed to the hospital's
260
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held the hospital liable for the unauthorized disclosure of his test results,' but concluded that suspension was appropriate.27 Although
the court noted that at the time Behringer acquired the disease no
physician had transmitted HIV to his patient,2 the court agreed that
the patient should be the "ultimate arbiter" in assessing the potential
for harm.29
Similarly, that same year, in In re Milton S. Hershey Medical Center ' 0 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the hospital's disclosure of a resident's HIV status to over 400 patients and colleagues to
whom the resident provided assistance during invasive procedures."'
The court concluded that the hospital acted reasonably in revealing
the resident's HIV status to patients because of the strong likelihood
that the resident may have exposed a patient to HIV after cutting his
surgical glove during an invasive, internal procedure. 2 The resident, who eventually voluntarily withdrew from invasive procedures,
argued that his right to privacy, as defined by a state statute, outweighed the compelling need to disclose his HIV status to parents.2
The court rejected this argument because his name was kept confidential and because the notification form to patients stated only that
they had been exposed to an HIV-positive physician and that the
hospital would provide HIV testing and counseling.2 7 4 Consequently,
the court held that the public's right to be informed of a highly contagious and inevitably fatal disease outweighed the physician's right
to maintain confidentiality regarding his HIV status.27
Three years later in Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp.276 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held
that the hospital did not violate an HIV-positive surgeon's rights
emergency room-where he worked-and was diagnosed with AIDS. See id. at 60708, 592 A.2d at 1255-56.
266
See id. at 641-42, 592 A.2d at 1273-74.
267

See id. at 658, 592 A.2d at 1283. The court noted that all parties recognized

that the informed consent requirement was actually a form of "de facto prohibition"
from surgical privileges because no patients would likely consent. See id. at 613, 592
A.2d at 1258.
See id. at 647, 592 A.2d at 1276-77.
69
See id. at 657-58, 592 A.2d at 1283.
270 634 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1993).
2
See id. The number of patients informed includes those at Harrisburg Hospital, for which the resident also worked. See id.
272 See id. But see id. at 162 n.2 (commenting that the hospital could not establish
if the resident had nicked his surgical glove).
273 See id. at 162.
27

See id.

275

Seid.
887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994).

26
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when the hospital threatened suspension of surgical privileges unless
the physician obtained informed consent.1 7 The court also concluded that the hospital appropriately informed 1000 patients of
their potential exposure to HIV. 8 Therefore, cases since Hershey and
Estate of Behringer have concluded that a physician who performs invasive, exposure-prone procedures poses a material risk.
Although a patient is likely to prove that the risk of HIV transmission is material and would result in his foregoing a procedure,
proving causation is often insurmountable in a strict informed consent case seeking recovery; transmission has been documented in the
United States only on six occasions, by a single doctor, Dr. David
Acer, and once in France, by an orthopedic surgeon."' Because the
causation element is impossible to prove, the disposition of a traditional informed consent claim is predetermined in favor of the physician
That strict informed consent is not possible unless someone contracts the disease from an HIV-infected physician should not
preclude the possibility of a patient recovering for the emotional distress associated with learning of a physician's HIV status.
B.

The Negligent and IntentionalInfliction ofEmotionalDistress

In Faya v. Almaraz,28 ' Maryland's highest court recognized recovery for two patients' emotional distress subsequent to learning that
their oncologist died of AIDS.2 * The court rejected the strict, traditional requirement of actual exposure. 282 Essentially, the court permitted recovery upon a showing that the patients suffered from emotional distress that was manifested by physical symptoms. 2 " The
court, however, limited the reasonable time frame for recovery as the
period between when they learned of their surgeon's HIV status and
when they learned that they were not HIV-positive.2 85 Essentially, the
See id. at 771-72.
See id. at 767.
9 See discussion, supra,introduction of this Note.
280 See Closen, supra note 24, at 96.
281 620 A.2d 327 (Md. Ct. App. 1993).
8 See id. at 329, 339 (holding that summary judgment in favor
of hospital and
physician should be reversed and remanded to determine (1) whether physician
negligently inflicted emotional distress on patient by failing to notify the patient of
his HIV status and (2) whether the hospital was liable for physician's failure to disclose that information based on agency principles).
283 See id. at 336.
284 See id. at 334, 338-39.
8
See id. at 339 (noting that six months is the appropriate window of reasonableness in measuring the anxiety that resulted because six months, as opposed to
twelve months, is the period of time necessary to confirm whether one has HIV).
27

278
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court applied a negligence standard and concluded that because the
physician knew his HIV status, and the emotional distress
was rea2
sonably foreseeable, he had a duty to warn his patients.
The majority of state court cases, however, requires actual injury, placing Faya in the minority.287 In Marchica v. Long Island Railroad,2" however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held in the employment context that actual exposure constitutes actual injury. 2
The court permitted Marchica, a railroad
worker, to prevail on a claim for the negligent infliction of emotional
distress for the railroad's failure to provide Marchica with a reasonably safe work environment.m
The Second Circuit relied in part on the Supreme Court's decision in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall,"' which permits recovery
for plaintiffs "'who sustain a physical impact as a result of a defendant's negligent conduct, or who are placed in immediate risk of
physical harm by that conduct.'" m Under a zone of danger test, the
Court concluded that employees can recover for both physical and
emotional injuries if an employer's negligent conduct threatens the
employee with imminent, physical impact. " ' Consequently, the Second Circuit recognized a claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress based on Marchica's possible contraction of HIV after

28

See id. at 337. The court also noted that the case should be remanded on an

ostensible agency claim to determine whether the hospital was vicariously liable. See
id. at 338-39 (holding that dismissal of all complaints was inappropriate).
287 See, e.g., Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 174, 181 (Cal. 1994) (holding
that patient's emotional distress claim failed due to a lack of actual exposure and
because it is more probable than not that the patient would not contract the disease); Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1357 (Del. 1995) (requiring actual exposure to the virus by the dentist to prevail on fraudulent misrepresentation claim,
which would only provide damages for economic harm and not mental anguish,
and holding that a battery claim based on informed consent was not recognized).
Although the Krins court noted that it had earlier followed Faya, which did not require actual injury, the Kerins court required actual injury. See id. at 174; see also
K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Minn. 1995) (requiring actual exposure by
an ob-gyn to prevail on claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress and rejecting the "zone of danger" test).
288 31 F.3d 1197 (2d Cir. 1994).
289 See id.at 1206.
29 See id. After being pricked by a hypodermic needle while
working in a railroad station, the court held that emotional distress did ensue as evidenced by physical manifestations of nightmares, sleeping difficulties, general irritability, crying,
vomiting, weight loss, and the need for psychiatric care. See id. at 1201, 1206.
81
512 U.S. 532 (1994).
Marchica,31 F.3d at 1203 (quoting Gottsha//, 512 U.S. at 547-48).
2S See id. (citing GottshalI 512 U.S. at 554-55).
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a needle prick and his subsequent emotional distress while waiting
for his HIV test results.2
Although Marchica held employers liable for the negligent infliction of emotional distress based on the fear of AIDS, recovery
should be permitted for patients who are exposed to HIV during an
invasive procedure by an HIV-positive physician. As stated earlier,
the physician owes a fiduciary duty to his patients."5 In fact, physicians owe a comparable or greater duty to patients than employers
owe to employees.2" Consequently, the Marchica decision, which
does not require a showing of actual exposure and infection to HIV,
provides support for Faya and for a patient's claim for emotional distress upon being exposed to HIV by a physician.
Admittedly, however, there are reporting problems because of
the complexity of invasive procedures as well as the disinclination of
HCWs to report needle pricks or other exposures during such a procedure.2 7 Nonetheless, courts should permit a patient to recover for
being operated upon by an HIV-infected physician based on the negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress, even without a
breach of universal precautions or other actual exposures. The distinction between the negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress should be based in part on whether the physician
knows of his HIV status. Regardless, an employer's failure to remove
hypodermic needles from the workplace is far less egregious than an
HIV-positive physician's invasion into a patient's body with a scalpel
or other sharp instrument."s
In short, under both section 504 and the ADA, courts perceive
the risk of a physician transmitting HIV to patients as material.2" In
addition, patients classify HIV-infected HCWs as a material risk as
demonstrated by various public opinion polls.' ° Therefore, HIVinfected HCWs who perform invasive, exposure-prone procedures
should be required to disclose that information to patients. If they
fail to provide patients with that information, those patients should
be permitted to recover for the infliction of emotional distress without being required to show that actual transmission has occurred.

See id. at 1206.
S See Closen, supra note 24, at 119. For a discussion of the fiduciary duty owed
to 1atients by doctors see Part IH.A of this Note.
See Closen, supra note 24, at 129-31.
See discussion, supra, Part I.B.
29 See supra notes 60-63 (discussing reporting problems).
"
See generally Part III.D of this Note.
so See supra notes 248-250.
94
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To prevent the patient from suffering emotional distress, however, more efficient solutions exist, such as implementing a policy of
mandatory testing."' If mandatory testing were required, physicians
would be removed from performing invasive procedures before potential exposure and consequential emotional damage occurred.
The challenge, however, is that the CDC, 30 2 the AMA, and the ADA 03
only require that the HCW know his seropositive status and that he
voluntarily abstain from risky procedures; these groups also maintain
that mandatory testing is unnecessary given the cost-benefit analysis.

0

4

Part II.D of this Note, however, illustrates why voluntary ab-

stention is useless and ineffective because physicians who know they
are HIV positive and realize that they should abstain from procedures
often disregard the risk. Nonetheless, threshold screening procedures and credentialing provide their own unique set of problems.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: CLEARER GUIDELINES, MANDATORY
SCREENING OF HCWs, AND INFORMED CONSENT

A.

Background: Statutory and ConstitutionalConsiderations

Generally, the ADA prohibits medical exams and inquiries before a conditional offer has been made to an applicant.305 A conditional offer, however, may hinge on the result of an HIV test if the
employer meets the following requirements: (1) all offerees in the
same category are required to submit to exams or inquiries even
though they may not have a disability, (2) all information collected
in that inquiry must be kept on separate forms and be protected by
confidentiality, and (3) the subsequent use of the results of the inquiry or exam must be consistent with the general requirements of
the ADA20 For an employer to use the results of an HIV test to
screen out an applicant, the employer must demonstrate that the
applicant was excluded for job-related concerns and the inability to
perform the essential functions of the job, even with a reasonable accommodation.0 7 Health care is usually the easiest field in which to

301

See Closen, supra note 24, at 132-33.
See supraPart I.B.2 of this Note (enumerating CDC Recommendations, which

provide that a HCW should know his H1V status and should consult with an expert
panel to determine whether disclosure is appropriate).
sos See FURROW ET AL., supra note 14, at 418-19.
304 See discussion, supraPart
1.B of this Note.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14 (1998).
3" See id.
307 See id. § 1630.14(b)
(3).
30
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meet these requirements, in part, because the CDC guidelines address the issue."o
Upon securing employment, an HCW may be required to submit to an HIV test if and only if it is ajob-related concern and consistent with a business necessity." Again, these requirements are easy
to satisfy within the health care field. '0 As stated in Part I.B, the CDC
recommends that HCWs be aware of their HIV antibody status, that
they voluntarily be tested for HIV, and that they decline participation
in exposure-prone procedures unless expert panels have reviewed
their situations and provided recommendations."1 ' Although the
ADA permits HIV testing of applicants and employees in the health
care context provided that employers adhere to the aforementioned
requirements, the constitutional ramifications have not yet been addressed in high-risk employment areas such as health care.
Generally, the Fourth Amendment's Search and Seizure
Clause 1' of the United States Constitution controls the analysis. The
United States Supreme Court has employed a balancing test in this
context to weigh the intrusion on the individual's privacy interest
against the state's legitimate or compelling interests. 1In
the context of HIV testing, courts have upheld mandatory testing programs

(1) for prisoners, because the government interest in preventing
HIV transmission outweighs prisoners' diminished expectations of
privacy;315 (2) for foreign service exams, because HIV testing impacts

308 See AMERJCANS wITH DISABIITIES AcT:

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYER 01-

§ 5.04(7) (Jonathan R. Mook et al. eds., 1997).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (4) (1998), 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c) (1998).
310 SeeAmgucANsWrTH DIsAILuTEsAcT, supranote 308, § 5.04(7).
31 See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text (discussing CDC Recommenda-

uGATION S

tions).

313 See Mark D. Johnson, Comment, HIV Testing of Health Care Workers: Conflict

Between the Common Law and the Centersfor Disease Contro, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 479, 502

(1993).
3 The Search and Seizure Clause provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
314

See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989)

(holding that Federal Railroad Administration was permitted to obtain employee
blood and urine samples to test for presence of drugs or alcohol absent particular-

ized suspicion of drug or alcohol use); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (holding that United States Customs Service could
require employees to submit to urinalysis without particularized suspicion of drug
use before being promoted to more sensitive positions that involve firearms).

35 See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 1989) (relying in large part

on Von Raab).
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general fitness for duty;"" (3) for both fire and police personnel, be-

cause they respond to medical emergencies;" 7 and (4) even for professional boxers, because they may pose a risk to their opponents. '
Although courts have upheld mandatory HIV testing in these contexts, mandatory testing has been struck down where the evidence
failed to demonstrate that casual contact posed a risk of HIV transmission.1 9 The health care industry, by its very nature, is distinguish-

able from these casual contact scenarios because HCWs engage in
invasive, exposure-prone procedures.
Although Congress declined to enact mandatory testing laws
even amidst the Acer cluster incident,' 0 a statutorily-based duty may
eliminate litigation in the area of informed consent and the infliction of emotional distress. In addition, mandatory testing would

eliminate the burden on the judiciary of making a medical and legal
determination of what constitutes a "significant risk," given the

CDC's failure to articulate more specific guidelines regarding questions of who, how, and when a HCW should not partake in patient
321
care.

316

Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of State, 662

F. Supp. 50, 54-55 (D.D.C. 1987).
317
See Closen, supra note 24, at 97 n.231 (comparing Anonymous Fireman v. City
of Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402, 418 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (holding that mandatory
HIV testing of firefighters is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment) with Doe v.
District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 573 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that HVpositive firefighter could not be denied employment based solely on his seropositive
status)).
318 See id. at 137-38 n.435.
319
See Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461,
464 (8th Cir. 1989). Gloveris disturbing because two patients tested positive for HIV
after an employee died from AIDS. See Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of
Retardation, 686 F. Supp. 243, 247 (D. Neb. 1988).
320
See discussion supraPart I.B.2.
321
See Chai R. Feldblum, A Response to Gostin, The HIV-Infected Health Care Prfessional. Public Policy, Discrimination, and Patient Safety, 19 LAw MED. & HEALTH CA
134, 136 (1991) (expressing a fear that voluntary self-deferral could lead to mandatory testing). Feldblum also notes that voluntary deferral by physicians provides litie or no incentive for hospitals to monitor HCWs because the standard of care as
articulated by the CDC does not exclude HIV-infected HCWs who perform invasive
procedures. See id. at 137; see also Larry Gostin, CDC Guidelines on HIV or HBVPositive Health Care Professionals Performing Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 19:1-2
LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 140, 142 (1991) (noting that CDC Recommendations
provide an appropriate balance-treating HIV-infected HCWs with respect while still
providing procedural safeguards to protect patients from HV exposure).
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Recommendations

This Note proposes three recommendations to clarify the ambiguity surrounding whether HIV-positive HCWs pose a "significant
risk" to patients and whether a patient should be informed of a
HCW's HIV status. First, the CDC should revise its recommendations to identify an exhaustive list of those invasive, exposure-prone
procedures that could result in potential transmission of HIV and
those that do not pose a risk.' At the same time, the CDC should
identify high-risk positions in the health care field. Second, Congress should implement a mandatory testing regime for those HCWs
who perform invasive, exposure-prone procedures."' Third, if a
HCW wishes to participate in such procedures upon learning of his
HIV status, written informed consent should be required. 2
As to the first recommendation, Congress should delegate to
the CDC the specific task of assembling specialists from the various
fields identified in the 1991 report, including cardiology, obstetrics
and gynecology, trauma and emergency room, orthopedics, dentistry, and surgery.3 25 After reviewing both approved and experimental procedures, the committee should make recommendations regarding which procedures could result in percutaneous"2 or
mucotaneous 32 exposure. Each year, the committee should review
any additional procedures that may have been developed. Subsequently, a more diverse committee of CDC and EEOC experts, the
AMA, the ADA, HCWs, ethicists, and patient representatives should
assemble to determine what constitutes a "significant risk" in the
sense of being an acceptable risk." Finally, Congress should codify
what precisely constitutes a "significant risk" so that the judiciary has
guidance to ensure more consistent applications of the "significant
risk" test.-"
Until Congress and the CDC clearly articulate a test to quantify
and qualify what constitutes a "significant risk" with HIV-infected
HCWs, this Note also recommends that a mandatory HIV testing re3m

See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 689 (noting that if Congress is unable to formu-

late suitable guidelines the task should be delegated to an agency).
3
See Closen, supra note 24, at 133-34.
324 Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 249 N.J. Super.
597, 657-58, 592 A.2d
1251, 1283 (Law Div. 1991).
2
See supra notes 69-70 (providing a definition of high risk procedures).
3" See supra note 42.
32
See supra note 42.
328 See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 689 (recommending
that Congress delegate the
task of clarifying "significant risk" if necessary).
32

Seeid.
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gime be implemented.3
Recognizing that a testing plan that
reaches all HCWs would be overbroad and unnecessary, testing
should be limited to those HCWs who participate in invasive, exposure-prone procedures."' These tests should be imposed every three
to six months, depending on the current state of medical knowledge
and how early one's seropositive status can be detected in the
blood.5 2 The cost of testing should be incurred by the hospital or
managed care organization for general HCWs, or by physicians, who
should consider the fee as a credentialing requirement for staff privileges."' In exchange for implementing testing, hospitals, managed
care organizations, and all HCWs should be afforded immunity from
liability for any claims related to emotional distress, but not for general negligence claims regarding malpractice.
Further, recognizing that HCWs' personal lives should not be
invaded, hospitals should implement strict confidentiality and reporting procedures to ensure that the results of these tests are not
disseminated.38 If a HCW tests positive for HIV, patients who were
treated by the HCW since the HCW was last tested should be contacted. 3 5 Any look-back contact, however, should not disclose the
name of the HIV-infected HCW.3 8 As illustrated in Part II.D and as
feared by experts, the CDC Recommendations do not provide
enough force or incentive for physicians to know their HIV status or
to abstain
voluntarily from invasive procedures if they are HIV3 7
positive.

Third, this Note recommends that an HIV-infected HCW be
permitted to participate in an invasive, exposure-prone procedure
only if he has obtained written informed consent from his patient regarding the likelihood of the risk and the harm that could ensue.3-"
If a HCW continues to defy the mandate, he should be reported to
3SO

See Closen, supra note 24, at 132.

See id. at 132-33.
See Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 339 (Ct. App. Md. 1993) (limiting recovery
to the period of reasonable anxiety).
S See Lowe, supra note 21, at 160 (using the control test to determine whether a
managed care organization, hospital, or health plan employs a doctor as an emplo ee or an independent contractor).
In re Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr., 634 A.2d 159, 162 (Pa. 1993) (protecting
the identity of an HI-infected HCW).
'35 See
id.
"'

2

336
337

338

See id.
See generally Feldblum, supranote 321, at 137; Closen, supra note 24, at 132.

Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 249 NJ. Super. 597, 657-58, 592 A.2d

1251, 1283 (Law Div. 1991) (requiring informed consent but not specifying
whether written consent is necessary).
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the local licensing agency, which should revoke that HCW's license
and should be permitted to impose administrative, civil, and criminal sanctions. Finally, if the HCW's employer also fails to comply
with these recommendations, it should be held liable for corporate
negligence.3 9
CONCLUSION

Despite tremendous medical advances over the past two decades, HIV continues to challenge the scientific and medical communities, demonstrating that there is no certainty regarding
HIV--except that it remains fatal.' Nonetheless, a balance must be
struck between an HIV-infected HCWs' right to be free from disability discrimination and patients' rights to be free from unnecessary
risks. Unfortunately, physicians and other HCWs have failed to heed
the CDC Recommendations that HCWs know their HIV status and
abstain from invasive procedures. Thus, the burden should be
placed on hospitals, managed care organizations, or other providers
to know their employees' HIV statuses.
Although the issue of HIV-infected HCWs remains sensitive,
mandatory testing should be implemented as the most effective way
to achieve an equilibrium between HCWs' and patients' interests. It
seems absurd that emergency fire and police personnel, professional
boxers, and foreign service personnel can be required to submit to
mandatory HIV testing,34' but that HCWs, who owe a fiduciary duty to
their patients, have continued to evade such a requirement. Although the probability of transmission is remote, HIV is lethal. Further, HCWs owe their patients unique responsibilities. These overriding considerations justify mandatory HIV testing.
Mara E. Zazzali

339

See Lowe, supra note 21, at 160-61 (asserting that the employment relationship

between the doctor and the hospital or the doctor and the health plan, including
managed care organizations, depends on the degree of control the employer has
over the doctor); see also supra note 98 (recommending downstream liability).
40
SeClosen, supranote 24, at 101-04.
341
See Closen, supranote 24, at 96-97.

